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Résumé 
Ce mémoire examine le rôle de la diversité dans une conception de la justice. Je 
débute en considérant l’abstraction de la différence impliquée dans le raisonnement utilisé 
pour arriver à une conception de la justice. Par la suite j’évalue le rôle des différences des 
groupes sociaux dans l’application des principes de justice, en considérant si la justice 
exige des droits individuels ou si les groupes peuvent revendiquer des droits différenciés. 
Ce mémoire utilise la position originale de John Rawls pour évaluer la première question, 
et sa conception de la personne et des groupes sociaux pour examiner la deuxième. Je 
soutiens que nous pouvons et devrions utiliser l’abstraction de la position originale, tant 
que nous sommes conscients de ses limites. Bien que sa conception politique de la personne 
soit également utile pour la défense des droits individuels, sa conception du groupe social 
n’est pas appropriée pour les groupes culturels ou historiquement opprimés, car il repose 
trop lourdement sur la notion d’association volontaire. J’analyse l’argument de Will 
Kymlicka concernant les droits minoritaires et j’enrichis la théorie de Rawls en ajoutant 
l’inégalité entre groupes. Je termine en examinant les problèmes concernant les minorités à 
l’intérieur des groupes minoritaires et conclue que les droits minoritaires ne sont justifiées 
que lorsqu’ils sont compatibles avec les droits individuels, et non pas quand ils renforcent 
une autre inégalité. Par conséquent, même si l’abstraction au niveau théorique est justifiée, 
les droits des groupes minoritaires exigeront qu’on  porte une attention aux différences 
entres groupes, ainsi qu’à l’intérieur de ceux-ci. 
Mots-clés : Rawls, la diversité, la position originale, le voile d’ignorance, l’autonomie, le 
féminisme, Kymlicka, la culture, le multiculturalisme, l’égalité 
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Abstract 
This thesis examines the role of diversity in a conception of justice. I begin by 
considering the abstraction from difference involved in the reasoning used to arrive at a 
conception of justice.  I then evaluate the role of social group difference in the application 
of principles of justice, considering whether justice demands principles that are the same 
for all in the form of individual rights or whether groups can claim differentiated rights.  
This thesis uses John Rawls’s original position to evaluate the first question, and his 
account of the self and social group to discuss the second. I argue that we can and should 
use the abstraction of the original position, so long as we are aware of its limits.  While 
Rawls’s political conception of the self is also useful for defending individual rights, his 
account of the social group is inappropriate for cultural or historically oppressed groups, as 
it relies too heavily on the notion of voluntary association.  I follow Will Kymlicka’s 
argument for minority rights and extend Rawls’s theory to consider inequality between 
groups.  I close by considering concerns regarding minorities within minorities, and 
conclude that minority rights are only justified when they are consistent with individual 
rights, not when they reinforce a different inequality.  Therefore, even though the 
abstraction at the theoretical level is justified, minority rights for groups will require 
attention to the differences between groups, as well as within them. 
Keywords: Rawls, diversity, original position, veil of ignorance, autonomy, 
communitarianism, feminism, Kymlicka, culture, multiculturalism, equality   
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 Introduction 
With the recent publicity of the debates over the reasonable accommodations of 
minority groups in Canada and an increased attention to multicultural, or differentiated 
rights among political philosophers,1 there has been increased debate over the relationship 
between social group differences and justice. This has subsequently led to discussions of 
“minorities within minority groups,” with a particular concern for the protection of 
women’s rights.2 This has led me to ask, is there a basis for the recognition of diversity 
more generally? What would this look like? What role should diversity play in a conception 
of justice?  
As Will Kymlicka has pointed out, on the one hand, in reaction to the history of 
racial segregation in the United States, and apartheid in South Africa, liberal philosophers 
have emphasized the importance of a difference-blind conception of justice.3 The argument 
for the difference-blind approach is based on the idea that race, sex or other group-based 
differences should not influence access to positions of power, or the distribution of other 
“benefits or burdens” of society. In this paradigm justice applies to individuals, and not 
social groups.  
                                                 
1 Will Kymlicka and W. J. Norman, "Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts," 
in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, ed. Will Kymlicka and W. J. Norman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 155. 
2 Penelope Deutscher, A Politics of Impossible Difference: The Later Work of Luce Irigaray (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 2-6; Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 12; Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's 
Rights, Contemporary Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3. 
3 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 141.   
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John Rawls’s conception of justice is often considered paradigmatic of the liberal 
view.4   According to Rawls, principles of justice can only be agreed upon when we put our 
differences aside, through the hypothetical choice situation of the “original position.”  
Rawls describes the original position as a “device of representation,” that models the 
conditions under which free and equal citizens would agree to principles of justice.5 
Deliberators are deprived of all the information that defines their particular situation 
through a device called the “veil of ignorance.” The original position therefore provides an 
impartial point of view, as it is free from bias and prejudice that come from knowledge of 
one’s social and economic position in society.6  Being equally situated, he argues that 
individuals would agree to two principles of justice. The first principle guarantees a system 
of basic human rights and liberties that apply equally to all, and the second principle 
promotes greater social equality, by limiting the contexts in which an inequality of 
resources would be accepted as just.7  
On the other hand, this has been seen as problematic in a growing discourse of 
difference based politics, and differentiated rights theorists have argued that justice requires 
the political or legal recognition of group differences. As Iris Marion Young points out, 
                                                 
4  Ruth Anna Putnam, "Why Not a Feminist Theory of Justice? ," in Women, Culture, and Development: A 
Study of Human Capabilities, ed. Martha Craven; Glover Nussbaum, Jonathan(Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 303.; Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 13. 
5 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded ed., Columbia Classics in Philosophy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 25. 
6 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 
165. 
7 Ibid., 13.  
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“Oppression happens to social groups.” 8 She argues that the reality of social groups must 
be recognized by a conception of justice, and not put aside or “transcended.” Rather, a 
theory of justice must take the concrete experience of everyday life as its starting point, 
because according to Young, “social justice means the elimination of institutionalized 
domination and oppression” and not merely the fair distribution of benefits and burdens.9 
She questions both the possibility and desirability of achieving an impartial point of view. 
To the extent that it is thought to be impossible, Young, and other feminists, have charged 
Rawls with “substitutionalism,” arguing that the original position reflects a distinctively 
male perspective, which merely masquerades as a universal position, and that other 
perspectives are excluded.10 To the extent that the abstraction is undesirable, Young argues 
that while “impartiality suggests that all moral situations should be treated according to the 
same rules,”11 the elimination of oppression will at times require attention to social group 
differences, for instance by implementing affirmative action policies.12   
 Communitarians argue that liberalism fails to recognize the role of social groups in 
shaping an individual’s life plans. Michael Sandel argues that Rawls’s theory is 
symptomatic of this problem, as it rests on a flawed account of a self that can choose 
her/his ends, independent of the social groups to which she/he belongs.  Consequently, 
Rawls’s focus on the individual blinds him to the way groups constitute individuals.13 
                                                 
8 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 9.  
9 Ibid., 15. 
10 Ibid., 116. 
11 Ibid., 10.  
12 Ibid., 11. 
13  Sandel, 179. 
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But while Young and communitarians emphasize the need to abandon some 
elements of liberalism, Kymlicka argues that minority rights are compatible with 
liberalism.  Kymlicka emphasizes the importance of culture for individuals, though he 
focuses on the way culture shapes its members’ “context of choice,” that is to say, their 
range of possibilities for life plans. He argues that when the survival of a minority culture is 
threatened, justice requires minority rights to secure the context of choice for it members.14    
Yet if we conclude that the particularity of social groups is relevant to the 
conception of justice, then we also have to keep in mind the differences within groups that 
might also be relevant to justice.  Such a situation would make it difficult, if not impossible 
to develop a manageable and coherent theory.  For instance, if we ought to consider the 
perspective of farmers, because they form a particular social group, then so do dairy 
farmers, and organic dairy farmers, and the list would be endless.15 The worry is that an 
attention to difference would reduce justice to conflicts between special interest groups.  
Under such circumstances, it seems unlikely that representatives would be able to agree on 
any principles of justice, beyond perhaps the most trivial principles.16  
A politics of recognition that pays attention to some group differences also faces the 
same charge of substitutionalism as Rawls’s liberalism. That is to say, such a position 
suppresses the diversity within a group through particular policies, or concerns that are 
supposed to affect the group as a whole.  A group representative speaking on behalf on the 
                                                 
14 Will Kymlicka, "The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas," Political Theory 20, no. 1 (1992): 
140. 
15 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 82-83. 
16 Putnam, 318. 
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entire group, say “women” may actually be voicing the concerns of “subset” of the group, 
such as “middle class women.”17 At its extreme, a politics of recognition could solidify a 
group’s identity.  Presenting a particular interest or perspective as representative of the 
group as a whole, may silence dissenting members, who hold valid concerns. Susan Moller 
Okin holds this view, as she worries that when special group rights apply to cultures, such 
policies could have the effect of reinforcing structures of oppression internal to the group. 
She points to the French policy of accepting the polygamous marriages of immigrants in 
France, as an example of how a minority right has silenced the arguments of critics who 
spoke out against the practice in Africa.  Okin sees the policy as not only suppressing 
dissent, but also more importantly, as supporting the patriarchal control of women, and 
limiting women to a context of “no choice.”18   
Similarly, recognizing the identity and interests of a group in a legal context, may 
solidify their identity in a way that makes the emergence of new, future identities for that 
group more difficult, if not impossible. Penelope Deutscher gives the example of legal 
discussions over how to settle indigenous land rights and claims to compensation in 
Australia worked to define a “Native Identity” that inhibited the transformation of that 
identity. The common perception among non-indigenous Australians was that “those living 
in the cities are thought not to be representative of Aborigines, and indeed, not to be ‘real’ 
Aborigines, particularly if they have some white forbears.”19  
                                                 
17 Ibid., 317. 
18 Susan Moller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?," in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, ed. 
Susan Moller Okin et al.(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9-10;15. 
19 Deutscher, 48. 
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It is with these problems in mind that I wish to consider the concept of diversity and 
its relation to justice, in order to avoid limiting the discussion to multiculturalism.20  This 
will make it possible to address the issue of “homogenizing” or essentializing group 
differences. The concept of diversity also includes differences such as age, ability and 
gender, which are sometimes left out of discussions of pluralism, because they are not 
usually considered “cultures.”21  Young similarly argues that one of the problems with 
recent philosophical discussions over justice and difference is the tendency to focus on 
cultures.22  Along similar lines of thinking, my own focus on diversity is intended to move 
away from the perspective of groups toward a focus on how groups shape individual 
identities, as well as how individuals transform group identity.    
With an attention to diversity, I will consider the following questions: Should a 
conception of justice include recognition of social differences? Does putting our differences 
aside facilitate agreement on the principles of justice and prevent discrimination? Is it 
possible and desirable to do this, or, does the elimination of oppression require recognition 
of differences? 
 
                                                 
20 Kymlicka has limited his discussion of group rights to “narrowly” defined cultures, referring to ‘a people’. 
Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 18-19.  
21 Deutscher, 3. 
22 Iris Marion Young, "Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference," in Contemporary Debates in 
Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas Christiano and John Philip Christman(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 
363; 371. 
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A Theory of Justice: Difference Blind, or Potentially Multicultural?  
John Rawls’s extensive writings on justice and politics23 will be the focus of this 
thesis, as it is the starting point for most philosophical projects that pursue the development 
of just social relations. As I previously mentioned, the original position is a method that 
puts aside differences between individuals in the interest of arriving at a consensus on the 
principles justice.  Not only does the process require abstracting from the particularities that 
situate us, but the principles themselves are also meant to be “neutral” with respect to 
group-based differences.  He claims that liberty will preserve a diversity of interests and 
life plans, as the state does not say anything about which life plans are worth pursuing. 
Freedom of speech and association would also foster ideological diversity, as individuals 
and associations are free to articulate different religious and philosophical theories.  
Moreover, anyone can participate in politics or pursue their life plans, encouraging 
diversity in civil society.24  As a result, Rawls’s Theory of Justice has often been cited as an 
example of the difference-blind approach to justice, both for his method, and the neutrality 
inherent in the principles of justice themselves. Interestingly though, liberal 
multiculturalists like Kymlicka have also found that Rawls’s liberalism, does provide a 
useful framework for defending multicultural rights.  
Because Rawls’s work has inspired both criticism and new possibilities around the 
subject of diversity, and its relationship to justice, this thesis will devote considerable space 
to analysing the possibilities and the limits of Rawls’s theory.  Unlike Young and other 
                                                 
23 Some critics see significant changes from one book to another.  I treat the collection of his work as a whole, 
and see his later writings as clarifications on earlier writings, unless it was marked as a change.  
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critics, I do not think that bracketing our differences is impossible. Nor do I think it is 
always undesirable. I argue that bracketing our differences and particularities in order to 
attain an impartial point of view remains useful for achieving agreement and justifying 
principles of equality, so long as we pay attention to the limits of this device.  But while we 
should bracket our differences as part of a method for principles of justice, we cannot 
afford to take a difference blind approach in the application of those principles.  This 
argument will require the following three parts, examining Rawls’s method for arriving at 
principles, as well as conceptions of self, and social group.  
Beginning with an evaluation of the details of Rawls’s original position, the first 
chapter will focus on the question of the role of difference at the conceptual level.25  In 
other words, what reasons do we use to justify our principles, or what are the meta-
principles of justice? This question is not about proper political representation, as an 
adequate role for diversity in the political arena is a question for political science.  Rather, it 
is about the role of diversity in a conception of justice, including its definition and how we 
arrive at its conclusion.   At this point, the concern is simply, what method of reasoning 
should be used to come to an agreement on what constitutes a fair social arrangement of 
benefits and burdens. This question is separate from the (still important) questions of 
applying a conception of justice and of what is required to successfully protect the rights 
and freedoms in a multicultural society.  To adequately treat the latter question, we must be 
clear on how we ought to come up with a conception of justice in the first place: do our 
                                                                                                                                                    
24 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 26. 
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reasons for particular principles appeal to a common ground, or ought we voice our 
differences at this very first stage of reasoning about principles of justice.  
While Rawls considers the original position to be based on an intersubjective theory 
of moral reasoning, the point of view of the original position is achieved by situating 
oneself behind the “veil of ignorance.” The first chapter will therefore consider the 
arguments in favour of this abstraction, as well as criticisms of it.  Here we will examine 
the charge of substitutionalism, as critical theorists claim the impossibility of detaching oneself from one’s situation.   
In fact, they argue, the perspective represented in the original position is that of an able-
bodied, white, straight, professional male. In particular, they emphasize the impossibility of 
a disembodied and disembedded quality of the original position.  I argue that this is an 
inaccurate and over simplified depiction of the parties in the original position, and maintain 
that it is a possible thought experiment.  However, the description he gives the characters 
opens the door to the danger that the original position reflects a particular point of view.  I 
dispel claims of bias by considering the assumptions Rawls uses to describe the parties in 
the original position. 
In this context we must also consider the normative concern, that even if we can 
abstract from our differences, we should not.  The abstraction achieved through the veil of 
ignorance is intended to eliminate bias from moral reasoning and mitigate structural 
inequalities. It is meant to enable agreement on the principles of justice, thus resolving 
                                                                                                                                                    
25 The first chapter will be somewhat longer than the other two because it describes a number of important 
concepts and addresses a substantial number of criticisms. 
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interest group conflict.26  Yet critics claim it is preferable to begin with the concrete; to find 
agreement between real, situated individuals. Dialogue is thought to provide a better 
alternative to achieve these aims and suggests considering our differences from the 
beginning of our deliberations over principles of justice.27   I continue to defend Rawls by 
examining the intentions of the original position, but point to its limitations. This does not 
imply that we should reject the original position.  Indeed, I will argue that the two models 
of moral reasoning are compatible. 
The second chapter will focus on Rawls’s conception of the self as the subject of 
basic individual rights that apply equally to all, as the defence of his liberal conception of 
justice is directly linked to his conception of the self and of society.  As Rawls explains, his 
theory “does not proceed from practical reason alone but requires a procedure that models 
conceptions of society and person.”28  Likewise, critics also point to Rawls’s conception of 
the self and of society as sources of the problem they have with his conception of justice.  
While Rawls describes the representatives in the original position as free and rationally 
autonomous, and citizens as “self-authenticating sources of valid claims,”29 
communitarians claim this is based on a misconceived sense of self, in which a person is 
prior to his or her ends, and his or her community. The account of an autonomous self is 
crucial for both Rawls’s emphasis on individual rights, and his treatment of groups.  
Autonomy justifies why we should respect an individual’s life plan, by protecting his/her 
                                                 
26 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 16. 
27 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 4.  
28 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 107.  
29 Ibid., 72.  
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rights and freedoms.  The freedom of association also protects groups, by interpreting them 
as formed or joined voluntarily by autonomous individuals. This has the benefit of avoiding 
problems of essentialism that plague conceptions of social groups.  
Nevertheless, his conception of the self is criticized for over-emphasizing our ability 
to choose, ignoring the way groups shape our identity and our ends.  Feminists embrace the 
concept of an autonomous self, but not at the expense of social relations. They emphasize 
that our ability to choice comes from our relationships with others, so this social dimension 
cannot be left out of an account of autonomy.30 Coming from a different point of view, 
communitarians argue that our identity is so bound up in our community that we do not 
experience the revision of our life plans, or the rejection of our communities’ norms 
without a sense of loss to our identity.31   
I argue that Rawls’s account of the self does include room for the influence of 
groups on an individual’s autonomy, without overstating it.  More specifically I argue that 
his political conception of the self, developed in his later writings, is defensible, as he 
explains that he is only concerned with an account of the self as a citizen. In other words, 
there is no need to determine the metaphysical truth regarding the individual autonomy. 
Rather, a political conception of the self requires only that we accept that individuals are 
capable of revising their ends for the purposes of determining their political rights. Thus, he 
correctly argues that reasonable individuals will agree to some variation of the two 
                                                 
30 Linda Barclay, "Autonomy and the Social Self," in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on 
Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 52. 
31 Sandel, 179. 
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principles he has outlined, with an emphasis on a standard set of individual rights and 
freedoms, regardless of the divergent views about human nature they might have.32 This 
leaves room for the possibility that someone may identify closely with a religion or moral 
doctrine so long as they accept political autonomy, which guarantees their right to revise 
their ends or change religions if ever they should want to, no matter how unlikely that 
might seem in the moment.   
In the third chapter, the question is, must the principles of justice apply to 
individuals, or can groups claim rights too? On what grounds can some groups claim 
exceptions to laws? Can groups seek protection to preserve their culture at the expense of 
some individual rights?  One example that has sparked a lot of controversy involves the 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez case, which gives the leaders of Aboriginal groups the right 
to deny some individuals membership if their mother married outside of the group.  It 
should be clear that I am not concerned with actual practice or law but with philosophical 
arguments. The purpose is not to evaluate the particular case, but to use it to see what that 
says about a conception of justice.  I will argue that cultural and historically oppressed 
groups raise concerns about justice between groups, which Rawls’s conception of a social 
group fails to account for. However, there is potential with his difference principle, which 
could be expanded to handle such cases. Here we follow Kymlicka’s argument supporting 
rights for cultural groups, which are consistent with Rawls’s liberalism.  
As we noted at the beginning of this thesis, it is possible for culture to either 
constrain or enable individuals, so we cannot support groups without appropriate attention 
                                                 
32 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 30-32. 
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to the way minority rights can potentially reinforce structures of oppression.  However, by 
developing an account of minority rights with a Rawlsian framework, the individual 
remains the priority.33 Thus, minority rights are not supported if they are intended to restrict 
the rights of the group’s members, for example through censorship.  Indeed, developing 
minority rights with the paradigm of individual rights and freedoms gives a voice to 
minorities within minorities.  As a result, the concern over structures of oppression within 
minorities does not support a move to abandon all rights for cultural groups.   
Thus, while it is appropriate to abstract from group based differences in order to 
develop and justify principles of justice, a conception of justice cannot afford to ignore 
differences in its application, but requires a careful balance between respect for individual 
rights which apply equally to all, as well as minority rights to preserve vulnerable cultural 
structures.  
 
 
                                                 
33 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 37.; Phillips, 162. 
  
Chapter 1 
The Original Position: a Way to Agree on Equality 
The “veil of ignorance” in the original position is the device Rawls develops for 
arriving at a conception of justice to which all can agree.  It involves bracketing knowledge 
of one’s social position, culture and other individuating characteristics. Critics argue that 
the required abstraction is both impossible and undesirable, and that attention to difference 
recognized through dialogue is a more effective method for developing an impartial point 
of view.  As Iris Marion Young claims:  
It is impossible to reason about substantive moral issues without understanding their substance, 
which always presupposes some particular social and historical context and one has no motive for 
making moral judgments and resolving moral dilemmas unless the outcome matters, unless one has a 
particular and passionate interest in the outcome.34 
 
After examining in detail the description of the original position, this chapter will 
assess these criticisms of Rawls.  I will begin by arguing that the original position is not an 
impossible thought experiment.  It does not postulate completely ‘disembodied and 
disembedded’ reasoners, as is sometimes thought. Rather, the parties in the original 
position are characterized by a few assumptions. Rawls assumes they 1) have the capacity 
for a conception of the good, 2) have a capacity for a sense of justice, 3) have abilities 
‘within the normal range’ and initially, 4) are ‘heads of households.’  However, critics who 
deny the possibility of original position, also argue that the supposedly impartial point of 
view actually expresses the perspective of a particular social group. This charge of 
                                                 
34 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 104.  
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“substitutionalism” must also be invalidated in order to establish the possibility of the 
original position.  To do this I will examine each of Rawls’s stated assumptions.  With the 
assumptions of ‘heads of households’ dropped by Rawls in his later work of Political 
Liberalism, there seems to be the potential for bias with only one of the assumptions: that 
the parties will have abilities within the normal range.  Altering this assumption would not 
change the original position drastically.  More importantly, it does not call into question the 
effectiveness of the “veil of ignorance,” which is the target of the impossibility claim.  
Once I have invalidated the impossibility claim, I will respond to the normative 
claim that we should not abstract from our differences and hope to arrive at a moral point of 
view.  At this point I will examine the objectives of the veil of ignorance. It is designed to 
produce a conception of justice that is free of bias and self-interest; does not reinforce 
unfair bargaining advantages but mitigates contingent structures of inequality; and make 
meaningful agreement possible. Critics who abandon Rawls’s original position point to 
moral dialogue as an alternative method for achieving the same goals.35 I think it is a 
mistake to view moral dialogue as an alternative and I will argue that the two models are 
compatible.  Rather than abandon the original position, we need to be clear about what the 
original position is trying to achieve and what its limits are.  As we shall see, the original 
position does not provide any criteria to verify whether or not we have achieved an 
impartial point of view. It thus may not be able to provide the ‘final word’ on justice.  Nor 
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does he provide an account of how social structures oppress groups differently.  What is 
worse, the original position is not complex enough to understand what it is really like to be 
in the position of “least advantaged.”  While these are important limits, the original position 
is intended to be “an expository device which sums up the meaning of these conditions and 
helps us extract their consequences.”36  This makes the original position a powerfully 
imaginative tool for reasoning about justice, and for that reason should not be abandoned.  
The original position and its critics point to two radically different ways to treat the 
relationship between social groups and a conception of justice. This chapter therefore 
attends to the first part of the question of the relationship between difference and justice, 
while social groups and the application of the principles will be considered in the following 
two chapters.   
Intersubjectivity  
Before we get into the details of the original position, it is important to examine 
how Rawls’s theory is based on intersubjectivity.  He sees society as the result of 
individuals coming together in mutual advantage. By this he means that cooperation 
produces a surplus of goods, and that every individual thereby has a better life than she/he 
would have had on the basis of his or her own efforts alone.  As a result, this surplus of 
benefits must be distributed, and conflicts arise out of competing claims to this surplus. The 
subject of justice is, therefore, the basic structure of society, and a set of principles is 
needed to determine the social arrangements for distributing the benefits and 
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responsibilities that result from living with others.37  Even though the principles are not 
intended to apply directly to the lives and actions of individuals,38 this implies that the very 
need for principles of justice is derived from the fact that our lives are inextricably linked.39  
Furthermore, by developing these universal principles of justice according to what 
all can agree to in a fair initial situation, Rawls preserves the intersubjective aspect of social 
contract theory in his conception of justice, despite criticisms that his devise involves 
solipsism.  Rawls takes it to be an advantage of his theory that, in contrast to utilitarianism, 
justice as fairness takes seriously “the plurality of distinct persons with separate ends.”40  
He compares the collective nature of an agreement in social contract theory with 
utilitarianism, which extends “to society the principle of choice of one man.”41  Rawls 
describes utilitarianism as the reasoning of  “an ideally rational and impartial spectator,” 
who calculates the best possible outcome after having considered the situation from every 
individual perspective.42 The calculation a single (idealized) individual emphasizes the 
monological nature of utilitarianism in contrast to contract theory. 
Similarly, Rawls distinguishes his account from Emmanuel Kant’s deontology, 
which determines “personal maxims.”   Kant begins from the point of view of an individual 
who reasons alone, and proceeds to imagine what would happen if everyone followed that 
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particular norm.43  The starting point of the original position, comparatively, begins with a 
collective agreement.44   
Yet while Rawls’s reasoning includes the hypothetical involvement of others, 
intersubjectivity alone does not tell us how individuals are differentiated, or in what way 
our differences are relevant in the context of justice. His use of the term plurality is 
misleading, as it implies different kinds of people.  All we know so far is that individuals 
have particular life plans, or ends. Individuation tells us nothing about the kinds of ends we 
have, or about how these ends might be connected to a group-based or collective end.45 
The Veil of Ignorance  
 In fact, Rawls requires that individuals abstract from their differences to arrive at a 
“common point of view from which their claims can be adjudicated.”46  The point of justice 
as fairness is to get past our individual perspectives, including the content of our rational 
life plans, to arrive at an impartial standpoint from which actual injustices can be judged 
and the principles of justice applied.47 In particular, we want to get distance from the self-
interest, biases, and unfair advantages imbedded in society, to decide on a fair distribution 
                                                 
43 Personal maxims also fail to capture the problem that occurs when an individual claims a derogation of the 
norm. This problem is avoided by beginning from a standpoint of collective agreement.  
44 John Rawls, " Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Richard 
Freeman(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 339. 
45 Sandel, 53.  
46 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 4.  
47 Alison  Jaggar, "L’imagination Au Pouvoir: Comparing John Rawls’s Method of Ideal Theory with Iris 
Marion Young’s Method of Critical Theory," in Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy : 
Theorizing the Non-Ideal, ed. lisa Tessman(New York: Springer, 2009), 60. 
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of the advantages and burdens that come from living together.48  To explicate this 
standpoint Rawls has us imagine a hypothetical situation, where we would have to reason 
without having knowledge of the particular facts that situates us, and ask what principles 
we would agree to. Rawls knows that society is full of inequalities, and that people can be 
biased.  But the original position has us ask, what principles would we all agree to, if we 
were in a situation of socio-economic equality?  What principles would we choose if there 
were no imbalance of power, no one acting under duress; if no one had more or less to lose 
than anyone else?49  The principles would provide a standard to identify and assess 
instances of injustice that occur in the real world.50  
 In the terminology of contract theory, this abstraction takes the form of restrictive 
conditions that are imposed to create an initial situation that is fair. This simply means that 
we have excluded morally irrelevant factors from our reasoning.  As Rawls puts it, the 
original position models our reasoning.  Justice is the result of a rational decision-making 
process and the conditions that restrict the individual’s choices are meant to illustrate the 
kind of information we want to exclude from our reasoning.51  
Establishing a fair initial situation is important for Rawls, because he uses a 
procedural approach, meaning that the fairness of the reasoning process will be mirrored in 
the outcome,52 or as Samuel Freeman puts it, the fairness is transferred from the procedure 
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to the principles.53  There are no “independent criteria” to judge if the principles of justice 
are right.  Rather, it is the procedure itself, because it is fair, that determines the justness of 
the resulting principles.54  Thus, what Rawls calls ‘justice as fairness’ refers to both the 
original position and to the principles set forth, as it “conveys the idea that the principles of 
justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.”55  It is also for this reason that the 
impartiality of the original position, derived from its restrictive conditions, is so important 
to Rawls’s theory. 
Before describing the conditions of the original position, we should note that Rawls 
suggests a way to test the acceptability of justice as fairness. We check “if the principles 
which would be chosen match our considered convictions of justice or extend them in an 
acceptable way.”56  When the principles do not match our convictions,  
We can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our existing judgments… 
Eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable 
conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgements duly pruned and adjusted.57   
 
When this occurs, we will be in a state of reflective equilibrium. This highlights the 
way Rawls moves back and forth between the ideal and the actual.  It is important to be 
aware of this element of his account, as it might seem as if he is working entirely within the 
realm of ideal conditions.     
The restrictive condition that requires the parties in the original position to abstract 
from the particular facts of their situation is called the “veil of ignorance.” Reasoners 
                                                 
53 Samuel Richard Freeman, Rawls, Routledge Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2007), 142. 
54Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 75. 
55 Ibid., 11.  
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exclude from moral reasoning: their class or social status; their “natural assets and abilities” 
such as intelligence and strength; their particular rational plans for life or as it is 
alternatively referred to, their conception of the good; the particular “features of their 
psychology,” such as attitudes of optimism or risk aversion; the political, economic or 
cultural circumstances of their own society, and the generation to which they belong.58  
This limits their knowledge to general facts about human beings and society.59  
There are many other ways in which we are situated, such as race, gender, ethnicity 
and religion, which Rawls oddly does not mention here.  In fact, these tend to be the 
“morally irrelevant differences” that most interest authors who discuss Rawls’s work.   
Susan Moller Okin is particularly concerned with the absence of gender, as Rawls uses the 
masculine pronoun throughout A Theory of Justice. This has her wonder whether justice as 
fairness really does apply to everyone, or if it perpetuates the male bias typical of the 
Enlightenment tradition, which Rawls follows.60  It sounds similar to the writings of the 
framers of the American Constitution, who while arguing for the basic rights and liberties 
for all, excluded women, and non-propertied or non-white men from citizenship.61  This 
concern will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. However, for now, it is 
important that we understand simply that the point of the veil of ignorance is to exclude all 
the particular facts about our situations and societies, and reason only from general 
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principles.  In Political Liberalism, Rawls does ultimately add race, ethnicity, sex and 
gender to the list of things that are irrelevant from a moral point of view.62 
Related to the veil of ignorance, Rawls adds a condition of equality.  That is, all 
“have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, 
submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on.”63  Thus, there should be no imbalance of 
power between individuals, as they stand in a relation of symmetry to one another. This 
condition reflects the condition of ignorance, as it requires that there be no relevant 
differences in situation between the parties and no one has any advantage over any other.  
What Goes on Behind the Veil 
The parties proceed by comparing different conceptions of justice.  Ideally, this 
process would lead the parties to consider all the options, in order that they may choose the 
best one.  This is not feasible, as we cannot be sure if we know of all the possibilities. 
While this points to a limit of contract theory, it simply means that the result, justice as 
fairness, is the best conception of justice we have come up with so far.64  In order for their 
reasoning to lead to a solution, four assumptions are made about the parties, which explain 
their choice.  The first two assumptions affect the outcome of the first principle, and the last 
two lead to the difference principle.  
We have seen that the veil of ignorance deprives the reasoners from knowing the 
particulars of their conception of the good, which is a person’s plan “designed to permit the 
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harmonious satisfaction of his interests.”65  However, they know they have the capacity for 
a conception of the good. With this in mind, the first assumption we make, is that the 
parties will be motivated by mutual disinterest, which is to say that they will want to 
“advance their conception of the good as best they can” whatever it turns out to be.66  
Mutual disinterest implies that they are not concerned about the socio-economic status of 
others.  Unlike envy, mutual disinterest indicates that no one will be “ready to accept a loss 
for himself if only others have less as well.”67  Envy is antithetical to mutual advantage.  A 
motivation of benevolence would also require them to accept a loss, though in this case for 
the advancement of the good of others.  Mutual disinterest in contrast, is intended to be a 
weak condition that does not require “extensive ties of natural sentiment” to account for the 
resulting choice of principles.68  
  Rawls adds a limit to the assumption of mutual disinterest.  Rawls is worried that 
given the account so far, there is no particular reason for the parties not to deplete all the 
available resources and amass the largest amount of goods as possible, improving the 
situation for themselves, and their contemporaries.  He thus adds a second motivational 
assumption: that the parties will be heads of households.  This way, if we assume that the 
parties care for at least their immediate descendants, then they would have a reason to agree 
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to what Rawls calls the “just savings principle,” which would require them to preserve 
some resources, and ensure justice between generations.69 
Given the description of the original position, this is how they will reason:  
The parties will conclude that there are things they will want regardless of what their 
rational plan will turn out to be.  These are primary social goods, which are divided into 
three categories: Rights and liberties, opportunities, and income and wealth.70 Rights and 
liberties will be the object of the first principle, and opportunities, income and wealth the 
object of the second.  The parties will be concerned with the distribution of these social 
goods, because they enable them to pursue their rational plan.  A reasoner will realize that 
“there is no way for him to win special advantages for himself.”71  Everyone will 
nonetheless agree to an unequal distribution of income and wealth if that inequality 
improves the situation of everyone else as compared to an equal distribution.  They will 
agree, therefore, to a principle of equal rights and liberties, and to a principle that allows an 
unequal distribution of economic goods, so long as the disparity advantages everyone. 
How they interpret “the advantage of everyone” is what leads to their acceptance of 
the difference principle.  Here they will reason according to the maximin rule, which 
instructs them to consider the worst-case scenario in each of the possible conceptions of 
justice.72  The third assumption about the parties is connected to this concern.  We assume 
that the parties have a capacity for a sense of justice, which is to say that the parties agree to 
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abide by the principles, whatever they turn out to be, once the veil of ignorance is lifted. 
This means that they will not agree to principles that are too demanding to follow.73   
The concern for the worst-case scenario is appropriate under these conditions for 
three reasons. First, they have no way of judging the likelihood of being the least 
advantaged.  Second, they will want to make sure that the worst-case scenario is above 
some social minimum, to avoid accepting an unreasonably terrible fate. Third, they will not 
want to accept “grave risks.” For example, utilitarianism could justify slavery, which is not 
an acceptable risk, and leads them to reject this conception of justice.74  
As a result of the maximin, the parties will be primarily concerned with how the 
least-advantaged representative person fairs in a society governed by justice as fairness. 
There are three kinds of “contingencies” that could make someone part of the least 
advantaged group: family and class origins, “natural endowments” and luck.”75  The parties 
will accept the difference principle, which says economic inequalities are permitted only if 
they improved the situation of the least advantaged representative person, as compared to 
an equal distribution.   
The forth assumption comes into play in the description of the least advantaged.  
Rawls assumes that the parties all have “physical needs and psychological capacities within 
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the normal range” in order to limit the difference principle to the socio-economic 
inequalities that arise between “full and active participants in society.” 76 
The maximin will also lead to two other restrictions on socio-economic inequalities.  
The first principle is given priority over the second principle, so that liberties can be 
exchanged for other liberties, but no one can sacrifice any of his or her basic liberties for a 
financial compensation, even if such a sacrifice improved everyone’s position.77  Basic 
human rights are non-negotiable.  We also add “the equal opportunity clause” to the 
difference principle to guarantee that public positions be open to all.  Again, even if there 
could be “an improvement to everyone’s situation” if some groups of individuals were 
excluded from positions of power and prestige, the exclusion would not be just.  This is 
because there is more to public offices than simply financial rewards.  These positions must 
be open to all, because everyone has the right to “experience the realization of self that 
comes from a skilful and devoted exercise of social duties.” 78 Moreover, Rawls specifies 
that the equal opportunity clause guarantees more than formal access to positions.  It must 
attend to social conditions such that individuals with similar abilities and motivations have 
a similar chance at attaining the desired public position.79  While vague, this is meant to 
advocate programs such as good public education or daycare, to achieve substantive – as 
opposed to merely formal – equality.80  As a result, the only justifiable inequalities are 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 83-84. 
77 Ibid., 132. 
78 Ibid., 73.  
79 Ibid., 63. 
80 Norman Daniels, "Democratic Equality: Rawls's Complex Egalitarianism," in The Cambridge Companion 
to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 249-250. 
  
 
27
economic inequalities, and those only if they occur in a situation of equal opportunity and 
improve the situation of the least advantaged representative person.    
At this point, we should note that the veil of ignorance involves completely 
eliminating the potential influence of the particulars that differentiate an individual’s 
situation and perspective.  At this level diversity is seen as a negative factor, which 
undermines fairness and interferes with the development of a conception of justice. This 
does not necessarily mean that ‘justice as fairness’ is de facto bad for diversity.  As was 
discussed in the introduction, the absence of diversity at the level of moral reasoning is 
thought to be necessary to ensure the equal human rights for all that foster diversity.  This 
will be examined in the next chapter.  But even at this level, critical theorists, feminists and 
communitarians who are concerned with diversity doubt the possibility and desirability of 
the required abstraction.  Here we will consider whether Rawls’s account corresponds to 
Thomas Nagel pejorative description of impartiality as “the view from nowhere.”81   
The Charge of Impossibility 
The charge is that, “no one can adopt a point of view that is completely impersonal 
and dispassionate, completely separated from any particular context and commitments.”82 
Claims of impartiality that result from abstraction allow “the particular experience and 
perspective of privileged groups to parade as universal” and “legitimates authoritarian 
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hierarchy.”83 Seyla Benhabib calls this position “substitutionalist” whereby “the 
experiences of a specific group of subjects [serve] as the paradigmatic case of the human as 
such.”84  
There are therefore two parts to the impossibility claim. Not only do these critics 
deny the possibility of the original position as a thought experiment, substitutionalism 
points to the way particular facts have been smuggled into the so-called abstract reasoning 
process, and thus reflects the particular experience of the dominant group.  I agree that 
complete abstraction is impossible, but as we shall see, Rawls acknowledge this as well.  
He rejects Nagel’s claim that he is trying to represent the view from nowhere, and agrees, 
“there is no such thing as a point of view of practical reason as such.”85    
The claim that the original position represents an impossible point of view is based 
on the interpretation of the parties in the original position as ‘disembodied and 
disembedded.’ This decontexualized and ahistorical quality is attributed to the original 
position, because of his search for an Archimedean standpoint on justice.  Recall that 
justice as fairness takes the basic structure of society to be its subject. Rawls does not want 
to develop principles of justice that are dependent on the “current conditions” of a 
particular society, but that are, rather, independent from it.86 
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Benhabib describes the disembodied nature of the parties as a mere reformulation of 
Kant’s conception of noumenal agency. She charges Rawls with “epistemic incoherence,” 
claiming that:  
Rawls recapitulates a basic problem with the Kantian conception of the self, namely, that noumenal 
selves cannot be individuated. If all that belongs to them as embodied, affective, suffering creatures, 
their memory and history, their ties and relations to others, are to be subsumed under the phenomenal 
realm, then what we are left with is an empty mask that is everyone and no one.87 
 
And Rawls indeed suggests:  
That we think of the original position as in important ways similar to the point of view from which 
noumenal selves see the world. The parties qua noumenal selves have complete freedom to choose 
whatever principles they wish; but they also have a desire to express their nature as rational and 
equal members of the intelligible realm with precisely this liberty to choose.88  
 
Nevertheless, we should not be so quick to attribute to Rawls what some have called 
the Kantian problem of disembodied noumenal selves.  Despite maintaining several 
connections with the Kantian tradition, he also seeks to distance himself from Kant in 
important ways. He claims to reject Kant’s dualisms, in particular, those of reason and 
desire and that of noumena and phenomena.89  Indeed Sandel notes that though Rawls 
wanted to maintain a Kantian conception of autonomy in which subjects are capable of 
choosing their ends, he wants to conceptualize the capacity for free will “without recourse 
to a transcendent or otherwise disembodied subject.”90 In this sense, it is explicitly the 
noumenal selves that Rawls rejects when he says he wants to avoid Kantian metaphysics. 
More concretely, the parties in the original position are embodied and embedded 
according to the motivational assumptions. Rawls agrees that it is impossible to reason 
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from a completely disembodied and disembedded stance.  With only a lack of information, 
absolutely nothing would happen and there would be no agreement.91  As we have seen, he 
in fact attributes two basic capacities to the parties: that they have a capacity to have a 
conception of the good, and a capacity for a sense of justice.  
Because the veil of ignorance prohibits the parties from knowing the content of their 
rational plan, all they know is that they have the capacity for one. This means that as a party 
in the original position, I may not know what my plans are, but I know that I do have plans. 
This capacity means the parties are motivated by the desire for primary goods. The capacity 
for justice signifies that the parties agree to follow the principles they choose and live 
according to them, once the veil is lifted.92 This capacity demonstrates how the parties are 
implicated in the results of their reasoning process. The parties do have some knowledge, 
and are indeed concerned with the outcome of their reasoning.  
We can legitimately make these assumptions because the parties in the original 
position are not supposed to describe actual people, as they are completely fictional.  
Comparing the imaginative quality of the original position to that of a play, Rawls explains 
that the objective is to characterize “citizens as free and equal persons” and from that 
standpoint determine the formal principles of justice that would regulate a system of fair 
social cooperation.93   
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Substitutionalism 
The thought experiment may not reflect decontextualized reasoning, but what about 
the charge of substitutionalism?  Critics claim that there is “one voice” heard in the original 
position, and that is “the voice of the dominant group in society.” 94  If this is an accurate 
description then the interests and concerns of the least advantaged of society might not have 
their claims heard. Let’s briefly consider whether this is the case in the original position by 
considering the assumptions.95 The concern here is to determine whether or not the original 
position, by virtue of its assumptions, proves to be an impossible thought experiment. To 
that extent, it is legitimate to focus on the potential for excluding different points of view 
that might exist in the original position. I will discuss each assumption in turn.  
Mutual Disinterest  
 
 That knowledge of their particular conception of the good is excluded, combined 
with the motivational assumption of mutual disinterest is regularly targeted as a source of 
bias by communitarians and feminists.  The idea is that we should not abstract from our 
particular conception of the good, because once the veil of ignorance is lifted, some rational 
plans will be advantaged and others disadvantaged.  According to Nagel, “The primary 
goods are not equally valuable in the pursuit of all conceptions of the good.”96  They are not 
                                                 
94 Putnam, 301. 
95 There are some other assumptions that do not describe the parties, so they are not discussed here. One of 
these assumptions, that society is closed, might seem to be relevant for this discussion as it potentially 
excludes immigrants. For reasons of space and focus I do not address it here, as it would require discussion of 
the relationship between nations.  This assumption does merit attention, and will be discussed in chapter three. 
96 Thomas Nagel, "Rawls on Justice," The Philosophical Review 82, no. 2 (1973): 228.  
  
 
32
useful for the kind of life plans that require a particular kind of social structure. For 
example a monk, who renounces individual possessions, power, and prestige, might prefer 
a distribution of goods that facilitates communal life as opposed to goods that facilitate 
individualistic pursuits. A utilitarian is similarly disadvantaged as he or she puts the good 
of the group over and above the good of the individual. The problem occurs any time an 
individual’s social position is tied up with their relation to others.97  Feminists focus on the 
assumption of mutual disinterest, which seems to preclude and disadvantage the traditional 
life taken up by many women to care for others above all else.98  As Nagel says: 
The original position seems to presuppose not just a neutral theory of the good, but a liberal, 
individualistic conception according to which the best that can be wished for someone is the 
unimpeded pursuit of his own path, provided it does not interfere with the rights of others.99 
 
The concern here is that by favouring some life plans, the outcome will not be 
neutral.100 This might be so, but the original position is not intended to guarantee a neutral 
outcome with respect to all conceptions of the good.  Rather, the original position is 
designed to ensure that the basic structure of society, and those institutions that comprise it, 
is fair.  There are in fact two kinds of cases in which a conception of the good may be 
limited or even excluded in a just society governed by the resulting principles of justice.  A 
conception of the good would be excluded if it were in direct conflict with the liberties and 
freedoms outlined by the first principle.101   Alternatively, a life plan may be disadvantaged 
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if, over time, it becomes less attractive and fewer people follow that lifestyle. Rawls says 
some religious groups may be diminished this way.  But this does not make the original 
position biased. The abstraction from particular conceptions of the good and assumption of 
mutual disinterest would be biased if it were the case that only individualistic conceptions 
of the good prosper under the principles of justice. This is not the intention of the original 
position. “The basic liberties are not intended to keep persons in isolation from one 
another…but to secure the right to free movement between associations and smaller 
communities.”102  
To emphasize this point, in Political Liberalism Rawls adds that a conception of the 
good includes “attachments to other persons and loyalties to various groups and 
affiliations” in addition to any “individualistic” ends we might pursue.103 The relationship 
between groups and a rational life plan will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter. At this point, it is only important to see how the original position does not smuggle 
in an individualistic bias with the assumption of mutual disinterest.  
Heads of Households 
 
 Some feminists also worry about the attempt to abstract from gender.   They worry 
that while the terminology is gender-neutral, women are excluded in the outcome.104  The 
particular concern is that a masculine perspective can be found in the assumption that the 
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parties will be heads of households.105 Carole Pateman argues that Rawls “inevitably 
introduces real embodied male and female beings into the course of his argument…Rawls’s 
participants in the original contract are, simultaneously, mere reasoning entities, and ‘heads 
of families’, or men who represent their wives.”106 
However, there is no reason for us to assume that “heads of households” would be 
men.  As Ruth Anna Putnam notes, there are plenty of women who are the ‘heads of their 
households’.107  Despite the ambiguity of the terminology used in A Theory of Justice, 
Rawls is quite clear in his later writings that all adults are citizens with political rights.108  
Recall that the point of assuming that the parties are ‘heads of households’ is to ensure that 
they are invested in future generations. The assumption was not intended to exclude 
women, nor is there any reason to think that heads of households would represent a 
distinctly male perspective.  
Rawls ultimately dropped this assumption.  Instead, it is sufficient to say that we 
will agree to ‘a just savings principle,’ by which we save however much we would have 
wanted other generations that precede us to have saved and left for us.109 This is a much 
more compelling reason to preserve resources and care for future generations.110  Rawls 
explains this change was suggested by Nagel and Parfit, and outlined independently in an 
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article By Jane English.  He follows their suggestion saying he “simply missed this better 
solution.”111  As a result, any concern over favouring a masculine point of view associated 
with the assumption is gone along with it. 
Capacity for a Sense of Justice  
The assumption that the parties have a capacity for a sense of justice carries the 
potential for an education or class bias. It refers to both an ability to judge the fairness of a 
situation, as well as the desire to act justly.112  Even though they bracket their intelligence, 
the parties in the original position must have already been socialized to develop the 
capacity for a sense of justice, in order to be able to engage in the thought experiment.  
With this comes the possibility that he is reflecting the point of view of the well educated. 
Lets be clear that Rawls does not require the parties to achieve the equivalent of 
drafting a constitution.  Rather, they must be able to consider the possible conceptions of 
justice, and judge if they are fair. Habermas nevertheless criticizes Rawls for having done 
all the normative work in constructing the original position: “The theoretician himself 
would have to shoulder the burden of anticipating at least parts of the information of which 
he previously relieved the parties in the original position!”113  Yet to put this burden back 
on the shoulders of ‘the people’ would no doubt be too demanding for some who lack 
formal training.  
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The sense of justice required to engage in the original position is the result of normal 
socialization, and not of higher education.   That is to say, it is acquired by experiencing 
love from one’s family, developing friendships and living under institutions that are 
publicly recognized to be just.114  It has more to do with the phenomenon of reciprocity, 
than intelligence: because others have cared about us, we in turn care about the good of 
others. The capacity is there, in everyone, to develop the desire for fairness and the ability 
to consider a wider view beyond their own self-interest.  While this does seem to rely on a 
metaphysical assumption about human nature, which we will discuss in the next chapter, 
this is not a problem of bias.  
With a different concern in mind, Fisk argues that this assumption carries a class bias. 
He claims we are naturally inclined toward class solidarity and not to a Rawlsian sense of 
justice. The ability and desire to get beyond group interest is achieved by the coercive use 
of public institutions such as the media, courts, and police by the segment of society that 
stands to gain from reducing conflict.115  However, Fisk is wrong to think that it is only in 
the interest of the “dominant class” to come to an agreement on principles of justice.  Often 
the desire for justice comes from those suffering oppression.  Principles of justice hold the 
dominant class accountable for their actions.  Thus, both concerns about class and 
education in this context are misplaced.  
Abilities within The Normal Range 
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As we saw, the veil of ignorance excludes from knowledge our “natural assets and 
abilities,” yet Rawls also assumes that the parties all have “physical needs and 
psychological capacities within the normal range.”116  Unlike the description of the parties 
as heads of households, Rawls never dropped this assumption.117  This has led critics to 
argue that the parties are all able-bodied, excluding the disabled, old, and young.  
We should begin by acknowledging that this assumption does not exclude the 
young and the old, because the parties will imagine that they will live through a full course 
of life.118  The principles of justice must protect children to the extent that they are future 
citizens.119  The parties would also want to ensure adequate care for the elderly.  Similarly, 
what Rawls calls “temporary disability,” would be a concern for the parties, as anyone can 
become sick or have an accident.  This ensures that the parties will be concerned with 
guaranteeing the availability of basic health care for all.120 The assumption that individuals 
have needs  “within the normal range” is prompted by the idea discussed earlier that society 
is the result of mutual advantage.  Thus, all must be able to cooperate and participate in 
society.121  But permanent disability or impairment does not preclude participation.  For 
example, being in a wheelchair does not imply that an individual cannot participate, so long 
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as there is accessibility.  As a positive aspect of Rawls’s theory, the abstraction of the 
original position highlights the way ability and disability cannot be seen as marking two 
distinct groups of individuals, but that we can slide easily from one into the other.122  It 
challenges and rejects an essentialist understanding of disability, and in fact makes 
structures of accessibility and health care a concern shared by everyone.  
  But differences in ability and the way people function “is hidden by the fact that a 
large number of us are able to get along in the particular environments we have made for 
ourselves.”123 In other words, disability is defined in terms of those whose physical or 
mental capacities do not correspond to the structural features of a given society.  The 
possibility of participation depends in part on “the provisions made by the society to enable 
handicapped people to participate in public life.”124 How can we provide the necessary 
structures to enable participation, without attention to the different ways we function?  
Attention to difference could occur at a later stage, after the principles of justice 
have been chosen.  This is the route Rawls takes. Disadvantages in natural ability are one of 
the three characteristics describing the “least advantaged” group.  The particular measures 
necessary to improve the situation of the least advantaged and the measures that achieve 
equality of opportunity can only be determined if we recognize how individuals function 
differently.  As Amy Baehr explains, the specific measures taken to meet the requirements 
                                                 
122 Martha Craven Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values (Cambridge: Belknap, 2007), 101. 
123. Ron Amundson, "Disability Rights: Universal Accessibility as a Public Good," in Not for Sale : In 
Defense of Public Goods, ed. Anatole Anton, Milton Fisk, and Nancy Holmström(Boulder: Westview Press, 
2000), 127-128. 
124 Putnam, 304.  
  
 
39
of the difference principle “is a question for a constitutional convention or a parliament.”125 
But this question is separate from the development of an argument that would support such 
a measure.   
Nonetheless, The terminology of “normal range” does seem to exclude extreme 
cases of disability when individuals are so dependent on others that it seems they cannot 
return the care they receive in anyway.  However, even the severely disabled will be 
considered citizens with equal rights regardless of their abilities, according to the first 
principle.  The normal range caveat is only added to the difference principle.   This is still 
insufficient, as it removes the disabled from the benefits and burdens of cooperation, 
simply because their needs are less common and can be costly.  This is odd, given the fact 
that the maximin instructs us to look at the cost of being in the least well-off position.  The 
amount of advantage gained by the more privileged positions is irrelevant from the point of 
view of the maximin.  It therefore does not seem justified to exclude some of the least 
advantaged, simply because the necessary institutional arrangements might be costly.  Even 
when one’s needs are atypical, severely disabled or impaired individuals nevertheless 
deserve specific institutional arrangements including care, education, and technology that 
facilitate interaction with others.126 This should be seen as a matter of justice, and not a 
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matter of charity.  To remove the disabled from the system of social cooperation assumes 
that someone, usually a family member, will care from them out of love.127  
Given these problems, I argue that Rawls should have dropped the “normal range” 
assumption.  The assumption is not necessary to arrive at agreement on the principles. It 
only matters if we assume that there are individuals who are incapable of contributing 
anything to society. Even the most dependent individuals can offer love, affection etc.128 I 
take the line that “people with impairments and related disabilities are not unproductive.”129 
Instead of using the concept of “the normal range,” I think a better way to treat this 
condition would be to claim that no one is so worthless that they cannot contribute anything 
to society.  This would also support the recognition of the caregivers’ work.  Martha 
Craven Nussbaum mentions that this is part of the issue of gender justice, as women do 
most of the care giving work. After having dropped the ‘heads of households’ assumption 
and because their gender is unknown to them, there is good reason to think that care giving 
would be considered work, even though much of this work is currently unpaid. These 
issues will come up again, but at this point the concern is over bias. The assumption is 
problematic, but it could be dropped. 
To summarize the argument thus far, there is no reason to think that the original 
position is an impossible thought experiment. The veil of ignorance does not require us to 
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imagine ourselves as disembedded and disembodied, reasoners.  The parties are situated by 
their capacity for a conception of the good. At the same time, momentarily bracketing our 
conception of the good is not an impossible feat. The parties are also implicated in the 
outcome by their capacity for justice.  While the assumption of heads of households 
initially raised red flags from feminists, it was ultimately dropped and the inclusion of all 
adults emphasized.  I suggest that the assumption that ability “falls within the normal 
range” be dropped, to remove any able-bodied bias, though this does not affect the 
construction of the original position, or the outcome of the principles in any important way. 
It therefore seems reasonable to say that the original position is not impossible to imagine.  
Monological or Dialogical? 
Some critics have focused on the normative claim, arguing that we should not 
abstract from our specificity and our differences. As part of this criticism, the original 
position has been described as “monological.” This label is credited to Jürgen Habermas, 
who contrasts monological and dialogical modes of moral reasoning.  As Christopher 
McMahon explains, “the distinction turns on the extent to which the identification of the 
correct principles of morality is a project that must be carried out collectively. Dialogical 
theories affirm this and monological theories – implicitly, at least – deny it.”130 Habermas 
characterizes the original position as monological, as he says the veil of ignorance “imposes 
a common perspective on the parties in the original position through informational 
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constraints and thereby neutralizes the multiplicity of particular interpretive perspectives 
from the outset.”131 Young that the veil of ignorance, intended to produce an impartial point 
of view, reduces “the plurality of moral subjects to one subjectivity.”132  Young notes that 
the original position also prohibits any communication between reasoners, in order to 
prevent individuals from banding together to develop bargaining advantages.  Thus, despite 
the fact that a plurality of moral subjects is the starting point for Rawls’s conception of 
justice, the original position is nevertheless a solitary activity in which the reasoning 
problem is solved by an individual, reasoning alone.133  
Rawls does not consider the fact that the characteristics that differentiate us are left 
out from his moral reasoning to be problematic for his theory. Rawls acknowledges that 
because the deliberators are behind the veil of ignorance, everyone is “similarly situated, 
each is convinced by the same arguments.”134  He takes this to be a positive feature of the 
theory because it means, “the original position must be interpreted so that one can at any 
time adopt its perspective.  It must make no difference when one takes up its point of view 
or who does so; … the principles are always chosen…the information is at all times the 
same.”135  Thus the debate is not over the fact that these characteristics are excluded, but 
rather why they are excluded and if they should be.   
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Moral Dialogue 
The alternative, which these critics endorse as preferable to the abstraction of the 
veil of ignorance, is usually a variation of moral dialogue.  Habermas’s “discourse ethics 
builds a moment of empathy or ‘ideal role-taking’ into the representation of the ideal 
procedure for arriving at reasoned agreement.”136 This representation is called the ideal 
speech situation, in which “everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else.” 
Through this process every individual ‘enlarges’ his or her own perspective, and develops a 
“we-perspective.”137  It is from this impartial standpoint that principles of justice, or more 
broadly, moral norms would be agreed upon.  Young finds that the ideal speech situation is 
still too idealized because it too remains a hypothetical scenario in which individuals must 
undertake a series of abstractions in order to arrive at a moral point of view.138  She also 
criticises Habermas for remaining committed to a common good, in which we find what is 
of interest to everyone, and in this way he also denies difference.139  She nevertheless 
builds her conception of justice on discourse ethics and emphasizes the importance of 
actual expression, by actual people.140 As she argues:  
Instead of a fictional contract, we need real participatory structures in which actual people, with their 
geographical, ethnic, gender and occupational differences assert their perspectives on social issues 
within institutions that encourage the representation of their distinct voices.141  
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Thus, despite her radical move, her essential focus, like many other critiques, is on 
the value of moral dialogue. 
Bruce Ackerman also rejects the veil of ignorance, saying it imposes “an 
unnecessary burden” and that the reasoning of liberal citizens could be modeled more 
directly.142  He suggests skipping the original position altogether, and poses a constraint on 
actual political dialogue, in the form of a single rule to be respected during political 
discourse.  Reasoners could “adopt a protocol that forbids them from engaging in 
justificatory arguments that require any citizen to assert that he or his conception of the 
good is superior to his fellow citizens'.”143 In other words, Ackerman argues that it is 
possible to imagine situated individuals reasoning, even when they are aware of their 
particular identities and group affiliations, so long as they do not break the one rule of 
political discourse. Citizenship is not achieved in the absence of difference; it is one facet 
of identity, along with other social roles and group affiliations.  
These are compelling claims and it would be naïve to ignore their intersubjective 
principle.  I will argue that it is a mistake to view moral dialogue as an alternative to the 
original position. In the remaining three sections of this chapter, I examine closely the 
objectives of the original position. I will clarify what the original position is intended to 
achieve. In each case I will consider the claim that the original position should be rejected 
and replaced with attention to difference through moral dialogue. I will defend Rawls from 
this criticism, but in doing so I will not neglect discussion of its limitations.  
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Bias and Discrimination  
 One of the objectives of the veil of ignorance is to eliminate bias from moral 
reasoning. Rawls’s concern is that the principles of justice should not be tailored to “the 
circumstances of one’s own case,” whatever those circumstances may be. 144   In other 
words, the principles should not favour any persons’ particular circumstances without good 
reason. This is because, he argues, people are “likely to stress the criteria which advance 
their ends” and this would result in a biased conception of justice that might favour a group 
of individuals who share the same interests, rather than one that reflects a moral point of 
view.145   
In particular, he prevents the parties from suggesting or choosing principles that are 
racially or sexually discriminatory, because behind the veil of ignorance, “no one can tell 
whether such principles would be to his advantage.”146  Rawls notes that in particular, 
“racial and sexual discrimination presupposes that some hold a favoured place in the social 
system, which they are willing to exploit to their advantage.  From the standpoint of 
persons similarly situated in an initial situation which is fair, the principles of explicit racist 
doctrines are not only unjust. They are irrational.”147  
Even if the same outcome were possible in a situation where individuals had more 
information than the veil of ignorance permits, Rawls still thinks a “thicker” veil is 
                                                                                                                                                    
143 Ibid.: 369.  
144 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 16. 
145 Ibid., 31.  
146 Ibid., 129. 
147 Ibid.  
  
 
46
preferable to a thin veil.148  A “thin veil” of ignorance would allow people to know what 
positions exist in society, without the individuals knowing to which position they belonged. 
Ackerman argues that the primary reason Rawls has for employing this thicker veil is to 
lead the parties to accept the difference principle.149  However, there is also the worry that 
behind a thin veil, reasoners would take chances they might later regret, effectively 
gambling with their rights and freedoms. For example, I may agree to give the majority an 
advantage, say to provide public funding to Christian education and not to any other 
religion if I know my chances of being Christian are 95%.150 In other words, a thick veil of 
ignorance is required to protect rights and freedoms for minority groups. This suggests that 
the thicker the veil of ignorance, the greater the extent of equality that is guaranteed. 
Benhabib interprets this as a way to “deactivate” our biases and prejudices. She 
claims the objective of the original position is to reason about principles of justice knowing 
only that others are “situated similarly to me” so that any misconceptions I have about 
others who are different, may have no part in my reasoning, or in my final choice of 
principles.  However, if the association between difference and prejudice is correct, then the 
original position has not removed these prejudices from my understanding of others, but 
only from the principles themselves.  According to Benhabib assessment: 
There is therefore the very real danger that in not making room to confront the ‘otherness’ of the 
other, the original position, despite Rawls’s own intentions to the contrary, can leave all our 
prejudices, misunderstandings and hostilities in society just as they are, hidden behind a veil.151  
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Benhabib concludes that there should be no constraints on discussion, as the only 
way to properly “defuse” these biases is if they are discussed and worked out by what she 
calls “concrete others.”152 Concrete others are distinguished from “generalized others,” 
whose perspectives are understood when one abstracts to see what we all have in common.  
The perspective of concrete others is defined by the way individuals are uniquely situated 
or constituted.153 Her concern is that “without engagement, confrontation, dialogue and 
even a ‘struggle for recognition’ in the Hegelian sense, we tend to constitute the otherness 
of the other by projection and fantasy or ignore it in indifference.”154  
There is, however, no guarantee that we will “embrace” otherness.  While 
reversibility might be possible among those who are similar, her account skims over the 
difficulty involved in understanding radically different perspectives.155  Moreover, 
Benhabib’s criticism misses the point.  Even though justice as fairness is not intended to 
regulate individual “attitudes and dispositions,” individuals are not permitted to violate the 
principles of justice.156 The parties in the original position know that in agreeing to the 
principles of justice, they have accepted whatever limitations those principles impose on 
their individual lives. Thus, they accept beforehand that they cannot pursue the subjugation 
of others. We should also keep in mind that Rawls imposes informational constraints on 
reasoning in a specific context: the development of principles of justice. Thus, it is not a 
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constraint on all forms of moral reasoning. Nor does he expect the original position to 
resolve all moral conflicts.157  To expect that questions about justice collapse into questions 
about morality more generally, seems to threaten “the liberal commitment to individual 
freedom, and the consequent plurality of definitions of the good.”158 As our concern is the 
appropriate relation between diversity and justice, this is not an acceptable trade off. 
Marilyn Friedman identifies a more pressing problem: we cannot be sure that we 
have completely “deactivated” all our biases and prejudices.  The problem is not that our 
biases are only temporarily subdued, and that we are free to be as prejudiced as we wish in 
actual society. Rather, the problem is that our reasons may be influenced by biases we were 
never aware of in the first place.  We have no way of verifying whether our subjective 
particulars tacitly affect our reasoning and subsequently, affect the principles resulting from 
it.159   “Reasons can be couched in terms which are universal and neutral, yet still advance 
special interests.”160  This problem is similar to substitutionalism, though Friedman does 
not doubt the possibility of abstraction so much as the possibility of verifying if we have 
achieved the desired abstraction. Precisely because Rawls takes a procedural approach, 
there are no independent criteria to verify whether or not the impartial standpoint, free of 
bias has been achieved.161  
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As we have seen, moral dialogue does not, unfortunately, guarantee the elimination 
of bias either.  Rather, because we “lack privileged accessto our own biases,” moral 
dialogue becomes an important part of arriving as closely as possible to a bias-free 
standpoint.162  Moral dialogue is therefore an important part of identifying existing biases, 
which is something that the original position cannot readily do.  But we do not need to 
choose between moral dialogue and the original position. In fact, we can see the two 
models working together in Rawls’s notion of reflective equilibrium.  Rawls argues that we 
check the acceptability of the conditions in original position by seeing if the resulting 
principles “match our considered convictions of justice.”  If not, then we can either change 
our convictions, or alter the conditions of the original position. This is what I attempted to 
do with my criticism of the condition of “the normal range” earlier on.  
We do need to be clear about precisely what the original position is supposed to 
achieve here.  Recall that the objective is to illustrate the conviction that such facts should 
not provide a bargaining advantage.  On a positive note, the original position has an 
important imaginative quality, which enables us to conceptualize this idea, and see what 
kind of principles could result from a situation in which our particular characteristics were 
unknown.  
Let’s be clear that the verification problem does indicate a limit to the original 
position.  This indicates that the original position may not describe a perfectly impartial 
point of view. Indeed, in Political Liberalism, the original position is referred to as public 
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point of view,163 and he characterizes impartiality as altruistic and distinguishes it from the 
notion of reciprocity.164  This limitation also indicates that the original position is most 
likely not the final word on justice.165  Indeed, there may always be a “better” description of 
the initial situation that we are not currently aware of, but this is not a fatal problem.  This 
just makes the choice of the two principles, the best solution relative to the list of 
alternatives,166 and implies that developing a conception of justice is an ongoing project. It 
does not mean that we should abandon the original position; we just need to be aware of its 
limits.  
The Basic Structure of Society 
We have described the original position as modeling our considered convictions of 
justice.  But pragmatically, will this not simply reinforce existing structures of oppression? 
In addition to eliminating bias, Rawls says that the veil of ignorance prevents the 
contingencies of natural talent or social circumstance from influencing the choice of 
principles of justice.167 The abstraction required by the veil of ignorance is intended to 
avoid “a reliance on existing conditions and established expectations.”168 How does the veil 
of ignorance achieve this aim? 
Recall that the “subject” of justice as fairness is the basic social structure of society. 
Clearly, the basic structure advantages some more than others when the institutional 
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arrangements give some a more favourable starting position.  According to Samuel 
Freeman, for example, those born into upper and middle class families tend to have more 
educational and occupational advantages.169 Rawls’s concern is that social structures and 
institutions should not necessarily reinforce the circumstantial distribution of social goods. 
Thus, the primary task of social justice will be concerned with the inequalities that result 
from institutional arrangements that favour certain starting positions, and the principles of 
justice should mitigate these inequalities. 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls explains that he is referring to “the bargaining 
advantages that inevitably arise with the background institutions of any society from 
cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies.”170  In other words, the veil of 
ignorance creates distance from our social structure or cultural context to examine the 
distribution of advantages and power instead of simply reinforcing existing structures of 
inequality or oppression. These social contingencies are therefore excluded because “the 
fact that we occupy a particular social position is not a good reason for us to propose, or to 
expect others to accept a conception of justice that favours those in this position.”171  Thus, 
these particular advantages coming from chance (i.e. social) circumstance should not have 
any bearing on the choice of the principles of justice.   
When it comes to group identity and diversity, what is particularly insightful about 
this, is its focus on the structures of society that position individuals differently, without 
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assuming that an individual’s position is fixed or essential.172  Young applauds this 
attention to structure, but does not think it goes far enough. By reducing justice to the 
distribution of ‘benefits and burdens’, it seems Rawls’s focus is on what Robert Nozick 
calls “end state patterns” as opposed to processes. We want to know what social processes 
produce these “end states;” why some groups of people get stuck in the category of the least 
advantaged. 173  
This criticism is somewhat simplistic, as Rawls is not just concerned with “end state 
patterns.” Rather he focuses on starting positions, which means resources could be 
allocated to education, or wheelchair accessibility, for instance, and does not just 
compensate victims for their bad luck.174  However Young’s criticism does point to a 
lacuna in Rawls’s discussion of social structures.  A look at how different starting positions 
are more or less advantaged, still does not tell us why they are advantaged, or if the social 
structures or institutions that create and perpetuate the arrangement are just.  
  As with the problem of bias, attention to difference through moral dialogue can 
teach us about structures of oppression and the changes that need to be made.  It is vital for 
understanding what the situation of the least-advantaged is like.  This is a significant limit 
of the original position.  It does not clearly identify the social processes that bring about 
inequality, but focuses rather on modeling the conviction that we ought to mitigate 
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structures of inequality.  Nevertheless, this is not a good reason to reject the original 
position.  It suggests rather, that the two models should work together, in the pursuit of 
fairness.  As Putnam suggests, the dialogic approach “would consist precisely in enhancing 
one’s ability to recognize a multiplicity of ‘least advantaged’ positions and an ability to 
hear and heed the complaints raised from these perspectives.” 175  
Agreement  
The veil of ignorance is motivated by a third consideration, as Rawls notes that 
differences between individuals are often the cause of conflict. If each individual tries only 
to further his or her own interests, it seems virtually impossible that they will come to any 
form of meaningful agreement.  Without the veil of ignorance, it seems that, at best, the 
principles agreed to would be “weak and trivial.”176  This is important, because principles 
need to be accepted by everyone for the claims of the oppressed to be heard and recognized 
as legitimate.177  He thinks only the most obvious cases of unfairness would be recognized 
as unjust, but many important issues would remain matters of conflict between individuals 
or groups.  
Rawls has been labelled unrealistic and utopian with respect to this confidence in 
the possibility of unanimity, particularly given the existence of value pluralism in most 
societies. 178 Taking this concern seriously, Rawls modified his claim, as he became 
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convinced that not everyone would agree to justice as fairness as a comprehensive view.179  
A comprehensive view is a religious, philosophical or moral doctrine that describes one’s 
view of the world and their relation to it.180  In light of this, he loosened the conception, 
putting comprehensive doctrines themselves behind the veil of ignorance, and now 
maintains that, in a context of reasonable pluralism individuals would agree to justice as 
fairness, when it is understood as a political conception.181 Reasonable individuals, who 
recognize others as free and equal, may endorse any number of political liberalisms, each 
giving different value or priority to the principles,182 but they will all agree that political 
liberalism should have the following three features:  
“First a list of basic rights, liberties and opportunities (such as those familiar from constitutional 
regimes); 
Second, an assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties and opportunities… 
Third, measures ensuring for all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their 
freedoms”.183  
 
He admits that an overlapping consensus with unreasonable doctrines like 
fundamentalist religious groups is not possible, and that a relation of toleration towards 
unreasonable groups is more appropriate.184  We can nonetheless say that realistically, 
abstracting from our differences guarantees the most agreement possible.  
 It is a mistake to think that all forms of difference will necessarily lead to 
disagreement.  It is possible to recognize others as different and still agree on fundamental 
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issues.  This possibility being the first premise of discourse ethics as deliberation fosters 
mutual understanding and respect. Recall that agreement is achieved through a certain 
empathy, and the development of a ‘we perspective.’  It is this consideration of different 
perspectives that enables agreement by discovering what interests we share in common.   
Unlike the original position, dialogue does not guarantee agreement.  Ideological 
differences in comprehensive doctrines are likely to generate value conflicts, and 
undermine the possibility of agreement. 185 Habermas admits this, and offers two possible 
solutions, which Thomas McCarthy considers.  The first is to let value conflicts be decided 
in a situation of fair bargaining. By itself, this seems unsatisfactory.  As McCarthy notes 
and as we seek in actual practice, individuals are usually not content to bargain with their 
values; values are usually too important to be traded for other things.  
McCarthy finds potential in focusing on fair procedures for deciding conflicts, such 
as majority rule.186 Benhabib likewise emphasizes the importance of decision making 
procedures, “which are radically open and fair to all.”187 Along with Benhabib, Young 
claims that the “theoretical discussion of justice, then, requires theoretical discussion of 
participatory democracy.”188  However, this would still be unsuccessful, as debates 
concerning value conflicts do not simply disappear once the majority has cast their votes.  
Minorities concerned that their rights have been violated, or that their interests have been 
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ignored, are not likely to stop protesting because of the legitimacy of majority rule.  Civil 
rights movements can attest to this.  If the minority group concerned does abandon their 
cause, then the result of this democratic process simply silences their perspective.  This can 
hardly be said to be justice. Such decision-making procedures may enable valuable 
discussion and increased mutual recognition, but they do not necessarily lead to agreement. 
It is worth repeating that we need agreement for a victim’s claim to injustice to be heard.    
As a second solution, Habermas suggests that when agreement is lacking we move 
the “discussion to a higher level of abstraction for example, from different preferences to 
freedom of choice, from opposed beliefs to liberty of conscience, from conflicting values to 
rights of privacy and the like.”189 McCarthy notes that this move highlights the usefulness 
of a Rawlsian abstraction.  This also highlights the compatibility of the original position 
and moral dialogue, as we could move up and down between levels of abstraction. While 
McCarthy focuses on moving up towards higher levels of abstraction, we can also move 
down when we are too far away from reality.  In this way, moral dialogue would help us get 
a better understanding for what the position of the least advantaged is actually like.  
Conclusion    
Unlike the critics discussed in this chapter, I do not think that the original position 
should be abandoned, but we have to keep in mind that it is a reasoning tool.  It is not an 
impossible thought experiment, but it is a fiction, because it is meant to help us idealize a 
context that is free of bias and oppression. It is meant to exercise our imagination, to get 
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past the biases and inequalities that exist in real life, and conceptualize other possibilities. It 
facilitates agreement, which is one of the biggest weaknesses of the dialogical approach. 
Moral dialogue does help us become aware of bias, and understand oppression, but this in 
no way undermines the importance of the original position as a conceptual tool for 
developing principles of justice.  So we have an answer to part of our initial question: we 
should abstract from our differences in order to develop principles of justice.  However, as 
we shall see, this does not imply that membership in a social or cultural group should not 
be recognized in the application of these principles of justice.   
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Chapter 2  
The Social Self: Conditions and Obstacles to Autonomy 
I have just shown that we should abstract from our social group differences in the 
original position, in order to choose the principles of justice. But does such a conception of 
justice require a difference blind approach in its application of principles? Recall that in the 
original position, we would first agree that rights and liberties should be distributed equally, 
by which we mean consistently and impartially to all persons.190  This seems to imply that 
the relationship between justice and difference in the application of principles also requires 
us to put differences aside.191  
This is an inclusive strategy that seems necessary, given our pervasive history of 
group-based oppression.  However, some critics find this emphasis on individual rights 
problematic.192 In some cases, they argue, equality requires attention to social group 
difference, and not just to individual needs which are the same for all.193  They argue that 
there are situations in which a collective goal or interest should be taken into account in the 
application of justice and this might require overriding individual rights. According to 
Young, it is precisely because of our history of group-based oppression and discrimination, 
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that “some of the disadvantages that oppressed groups suffer can be remedied in policy 
only by an affirmative acknowledgement of the group’s specificity.”194   
But the argument for recognition and protection of group rights is a vague claim, so 
we must be clear about what it entails.  It would be inaccurate if the claim implied that the 
difference-blind approach offers no protection to groups. In the liberal paradigm, granting 
individuals basic rights and freedoms is considered the best way to protect groups.  Rawls’s 
difference principle also refers to our social position, and requires us to view the social 
system from the perspective of the “least advantaged representative person.” Even though 
he later revised this aspect of his theory, justice as fairness still includes a principle that 
guarantees the means to achieve real, substantive equality. 
Nor do these differentiated rights theorists advocate a total rejection of individual 
rights. Indeed, most grant that some basic rights are inalienable.195  What they criticize is 
the way the liberal conception of the self does not seem to leave sufficient room for 
collective rights.  Charles Taylor for example is concerned that the liberal conception of the 
self will always prioritize the individual over the group, even in cases where the 
individual’s interest at stake is trivial in comparison to the collective good.196 The idea is 
that oppressed groups need to be able to discover and promote a positive self-identification, 
as well as determine their specific needs and interests. This process requires a principle of 
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“group autonomy” as opposed to individual autonomy.197  Young gives us a more concrete 
picture of what group autonomy entails, as she argues in favour of:  
Institutional mechanisms and public resources supporting 1) self-organization of group members so 
that they achieve collective empowerment…2) group analysis and group generation of policy 
proposals in institutional contexts where decision makers are obliged to show that their deliberations 
have taken group perspectives into consideration; and 3) group veto power regarding specific 
policies that affect a group directly.198  
 
 Thus, it is in the context of this concern that Rawls’s conception of the self has 
been accused of being too individualistic and paying inadequate attention to the way social 
groups are important to individuals.  Critics identify his account of the self as the root of 
the problem of inadequate attention to groups. His conception of the self is criticized as 
over-emphasizing our ability to choose, ignoring the way groups shape our identity and our 
ends. It assumes that individuals constitute groups when in fact groups constitute 
individuals.  While this was a conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, the ‘communitarian vs. 
liberal debate’ has now subsided.  Their criticisms are nevertheless important, for two 
reasons, in connection with the discussion of justice and social group difference. First, 
Rawls emphasizes his political conception of the self in the context of this debate. This 
emphasis is meant to facilitate a “reasonable pluralism” of comprehensive philosophical, 
religious and moral doctrines, and thus warrants a close examination.  But secondly, and 
more importantly, they raise questions about how cultural or other community ties should 
be recognized by a theory of justice in a political context.199 
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The concern over adequate recognition of difference is important, but I think the 
emphasis has been put in the wrong place.  I will argue that there is no problem with 
Rawls’s conception of the person. Rather it is his conception of a social group, which is the 
source of some difficulty.  A complete treatment of the question regarding the relationship 
between difference and the application of the principles of justice will therefore be treated 
in two separate parts.  In this chapter I will emphasize the defensibility of Rawls’s political 
conception of the self.  I agree with defenders of liberalism that Rawls adequately accounts 
for the way individuals are shaped by their attachments to groups.  After a look at how and 
why individual rights foster diversity, I will consider three aspects to the charge that his 
account of the self is individualistic:  a) That groups are the source of individual ends; b) 
That a healthy socialization for autonomy requires attention our earliest social relationships, 
in particular, the family; c) That groups constitute individual identity. 
I also agree with defenders of liberalism that the guarantee of individual rights 
promotes a good deal of diversity.  However, I do not think Rawls’s description of the 
social group as a voluntary association is robust enough to adequately recognize and protect 
cultural communities or historically oppressed groups.  In the next chapter, I will discuss 
these problems with Rawls’s account of the social group.  However, his account of social 
groups can be challenged without rejecting his conception of the person.  
Individual Rights and Diversity 
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That rights and freedoms apply to individuals and not groups is seen as the 
“defining feature” of liberalism according to Kymlicka.200  Rawls advocates justice as 
fairness as a particular form of liberalism because he finds it troubling that some 
conceptions of justice such as utilitarianism can justify a system of slavery. This possibility 
runs contrary to our deepest intuitions about justice.  Young illustrates the persuasive 
philosophical argument behind this intuition, as she shows how deconstructive criticism has 
exposed the faulty claim of essentialism that underlies most oppressive political systems.  
Briefly, essentialism results from a process of  “Othering,” whereby the dominant 
group defines value in terms of its own experiences and characteristics.  The dominant 
group then “measures the Others and finds them essentially lacking, excluded and or 
complementary to themselves.”201  The dominant group sees itself as having worth, and 
projects negative attributes onto the Others. “These oppositions legitimate the dehumanised 
use of the despised group as sweated labour.”202 Once this process is revealed, it becomes 
apparent how seemly natural distinctions are socially constructed.203  Rejecting this 
essentialist ideology, liberalism thus concludes that human rights must be ‘difference blind’ 
and apply equally to all as individuals. Young thinks the rejection of essentialism is right, 
but takes issue with the resulting conclusion about the role social groups play in the lives of 
individuals. Young is primarily concerned with how identity groups such as race and 
gender impact individuals, while Rawls has in mind associations such as unions or 
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scientific communities.  In the liberal paradigm, group affiliation is completely voluntary.  
That does not mean social groups of any kind cease to matter. To the contrary, a difference 
blind approach facilitates certain kinds of diversity within civil society.204 
As I argued in the last chapter, the guarantee of individual rights is intended to 
enable individuals to form, join and leave associations.  Individuals join associations to be 
recognized and develop a sense of self-worth, share final ends and common activities.205 
We want our projects to be recognized as worthwhile, and this is often achieved by joining 
an association in which others share similar interests and offer us support.206  Rawls is 
thinking particularly of religious institutions, but also families, friendships, and the arts and 
sciences.  He defines an association as a group united by a shared end, such that when it is 
realized, the group’s members “all find satisfaction in the same thing.”207  Kymlicka adds 
that:  
One of the major mechanisms for accommodating cultural differences is the protection of the civil 
and political rights of individuals.  It is impossible to overstate the importance of freedom of 
association, religion, speech, mobility, and political organization for protecting group difference. 
These rights enable individuals to form and maintain the various groups and associations which 
constitute civil society…The protection afforded by these common rights of citizenship is sufficient 
for many of the legitimate forms of diversity in society.208 
 
Justice as fairness also fosters a diversity of interests and lifestyles because the 
principles are not contingent on a particular conception of the good. The two principles 
maintain the social conditions that allow them to pursue and revise their ends.209  Unlike 
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utilitarianism, justice as fairness looks only at how the basic structure of society distributes 
these goods, and not at the choices we make in terms of how we use them.  This implies 
that Rawls’s theory of justice “does not prejudge the choice of the sort of persons that men 
want to be.”210 
As we shall discuss in the next chapter, it may be problematic to describe some 
social groups as voluntary associations.  But the underling idea here is that there is more 
than one possible good life and individuals can choose their conception of the good for 
themselves.  This claim underlies the principles of justice, for if human beings are not 
autonomous in this way, then it will not make sense to have put so much emphasis on 
ensuring the social conditions that enable freedom of choice.  
The parties in the original position are thought to have autonomy as a result of their 
two moral capacities: their capacity for a conception of the good and for a sense of justice. 
Thus, Rawls claims “we use the characterization of the persons in the original position to 
single out the kind of beings to whom the principles chosen apply.”211  These ‘moral 
powers’ thus deserve careful attention to be clear about what they entail.  Having a capacity 
for a rational plan models the parties’ freedom, in the sense that they do not think they are 
bound to any particular rational plan, but rather are independent from the particular aims 
they hold at any given moment.  In other words, this refers to their ‘highest order interests,’ 
or rather, the interests they have upon reflection.  These are the interests they endorse, or 
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want to want. They are also free to revise their plans, as this is not a static achievement, but 
an on-going process.  Our circumstances change, and we must be prepared to reflect on 
those changes. This leaves room for the reality that we can be mistaken about our ‘highest 
order interests,’ but we are nonetheless able to alter our plans upon that realization. Their 
capacity for a sense of justice similarly refers to the parties’ ability to reflect on and choose 
principles to govern their arrangements. The principles of justice are not merely the 
convictions of others, but are the choices one makes to govern one’s own life. Thus Rawls 
claims that when persons act from the principles of justice, they are “acting autonomously: 
they are acting from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best 
express their nature as free and equal rational beings.”212 
It is significant that Rawls refers to a person’s nature as free and equal, as he takes 
these moral powers to be a feature of human beings.  He has moved away from the fictional 
characters of the original position, to a conception of actual persons.  More specifically, he 
is referring to a ‘potential capacity,’ which almost everyone has to at least a minimum 
degree.213  By referring to human nature, Rawls’s theory is based on a particular conception 
of the person.  As he explains, if we try to avoid talk of natural rights and focus only on the 
procedural rule of equal consideration, “there is no guarantee of substantive equal treatment 
since slave and caste systems…may satisfy this conception.”214 But this argument will not 
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do: even if it is a nature we must cultivate, we have nevertheless slipped back into the 
territory of essentialism, which liberalism claims to reject.  
The Liberal Conception of the Self as Citizenship 
We do not need to dwell on this initial account of natural rights as Rawls has since 
moved away from talk of human nature.  Rather, he now specifies that the original position 
models a conception of citizens as free and equal.215 This modification is a crucial part of 
making justice as fairness a political conception.  What prompted his shift was the 
realization that in addition to the diversity he had considered in A Theory, the protection of 
basic rights and liberties will also foster a diversity of “reasonable comprehensive religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines.”216 Yet as we have just seen, justice as fairness requires 
an acceptance of the value of autonomy, and thus that individuals agree to the principles as 
part of a comprehensive doctrine.  
He emphasizes that this is a situation of reasonable pluralism, as opposed to the 
simple fact of pluralism, as reasonable doctrines can find an overlapping consensus about a 
conception of justice.  Those endorsing a variety of reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
can all agree on “the essentials of a democratic regime” even if they do not all agree on the 
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same comprehensive doctrine, or even on the specific conception of justice that best 
satisfies those essentials.217   
In his shift, Rawls maintains the view that citizens are modeled as free and equal 
when they have the two, above-mentioned moral powers, and continues to define the 
capacities required for autonomy in the same way as he did in A Theory. His description of 
autonomy remains the same, as it is primarily the scope that has changed.  He also develops 
the idea a bit more, adding that citizens are recognized as autonomous in an institutional 
context, as they are considered to be “self-authenticating sources of valid claims,” meaning 
that they can make claims on their institutions, and that their interests count at the social 
level, that is to say, the level at which policy is considered and made. He further adds that 
as free persons, they are also morally responsible for their life plans.218 
This change in scope is meant to permit a wider range of agreement.  As those 
holding a comprehensive doctrine that does not value autonomy may not agree to justice as 
fairness as it is described in A Theory.  A conception of justice must be political enough to 
appeal to illiberal or religious doctrines that do not value autonomy in their personal lives, 
so long as they are reasonable doctrines.  He now specifies that we must only agree to that 
account of autonomy for the purposes of our political or public sense of self.  Individuals 
can have a very different sense of self when it comes to other roles they carry out.  
I will now briefly review the communitarian-liberal debate to see how and why he 
came to this specification.  The characterization of justice as fairness as a political 
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conception will become clearer in light of this debate, as the critics discussed challenge 
Rawls’s account of autonomy.  It will also provide a useful point of departure for the 
discussion on the relationship between social groups and their relationship to individual 
rights.   
Autonomy and the Metaphysical Conception of the Self  
Michael Sandel picks up on the substantialism implicit in Rawls’s description of 
moral capacities.  He criticizes the claim that actual people can conceive of themselves as 
individuals with a conception of the good that they do not identify with.  He argues that this 
assumes there is an underlying self that has these interests, plans and desires.  Such a 
conception of the self is more than just a bundle of psychological states.  Sandel calls this 
conception of an underlying self, which is prior to its ends, voluntarist.219 We should note 
that Sandel finds this voluntarist conception of the self to have more nuance than the 
Kantian abstract self discussed in the previous chapter.  A Rawlsian self can stand at a 
distance from his/her ends “ with a certain priority, but [it] is also related to its ends.”220  He 
nevertheless thinks Rawls’s theory rests on a faulty metaphysical assumption that does not 
reflect the way we actually experience our relation to our ends.  
A person who can stand at a distance from his/her ends is “not simply a product of 
the vagaries of circumstance, but always irreducibly an active willing agent, distinguishable 
from [his/her] surroundings and capable of choice.”221  However, Sandel argues that we do 
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not choose our ends because an individual’s wants are socially determined. If a rational 
plan is the effective satisfaction of desires, then our rational plans are merely the ‘products 
of our socialization' and do not reflect that individual’s autonomy.  Rawls’s account 
includes the condition that they are not merely following their immediate desires, as the 
required reflection means they are concerned with their highest-order interests.  Sandel 
notes that these second-order interests are still subject to social determinism, implying that 
the agent’s conception of the good is heteronomous. 222  Sandel thinks that for an individual 
to be free, his ends would have to be “independent from the influence of pre-existing wants 
and desires – a ‘radically free choice’.”223  
This criticism is intended to draw our attention to the social conditions and social 
groups that influence our life plans.224 After this analysis of agency, Sandel concludes that 
an individual discovers his/her ends. “I ask, as I deliberate, not only what I really want, but 
who I really am,” and there is some “relative fixity” to my identity.225  As Chandran 
Kukathas rightly points out, this entails that “to reflect on ourselves and the nature of the 
good, would then be to reflect upon the good of the community.”226    
In a related manner, some feminists have argued that Rawls advocates an 
individualistic conception of autonomy that is antithetical to a feminist conception of the 
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self.227 Like communitarians, these feminists point to the way our desires, ends, and 
identities are formed in “their immersion in networks of relationships.”228 They share a 
concern for the social sources of our ends and identities, though they tend to emphasize the 
role of the family as opposed to the politico-cultural communities that concern most 
communitarians.229 
Macintyre interprets Rawls’s liberalism as individualistic, in the sense that “society 
is composed of individuals each with his or her own interest, who then come together to 
formulate common rules of life.”230 This is a conception of the person as prior to society. 
On Rawls’s account, it seems irrelevant how individuals come to have their particular 
interests, and so the role of community in shaping those ends is non-existent.  Young also 
interprets liberalism to presume “a conception of the self as transcending or prior to social 
context…[and] carries an implicit normative requirement that the authentic self is one that 
has voluntarily assumed all aspects of her or his life and identity.”231 
I will first respond to these claims somewhat generally, by appealing to the recent 
extensive discourse on autonomy.  This will be followed by a look at the specific response 
some authors have given to defend Rawls’s account. The claim that our ends are merely 
discovered and not chosen because they are always determined by our social context, rests 
on an argument for the incompatibility of autonomy with social determinism, which has 
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been widely rejected in the contemporary literature on autonomy.232  Reflecting on one’s 
ends does not mean creating them from nothing. It does not imply that one must somehow 
liberate himself or herself from all social influence.  “The autonomous person is not a 
passive receptacle of these forces but reflectively engages with them to participate in 
shaping a life for herself.”233 Self-government is widely accepted as the defining feature of 
autonomy234 as opposed to having “choices that are uninfluenced or uncaused,”235 as is 
implied by Sandel’s discussion of “radically free choice.”  This is important, because 
whatever problems we might have with Rawls’s conception of a social group as a voluntary 
association, this implies that we can nevertheless accept that individuals to have the 
capacity for autonomy. 
Nor does liberalism require an individual to be prior to his/her community in the sense 
of being self-made or self-sufficient in the way that Macintyre and Young suggest.  
Individuals are “prior to their social context” in the sense that social groups are important 
and relevant only because they are important to individuals.236  Being ‘prior to society’ in 
the sense described by Macintyre is negated by Rawls’s account of how “we decide our 
life-plans, not de novo, but rather from examining the models and ways of life of those who 
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have preceded us.”237 We can take this at least to leave open the possibility that it refers to 
the way parents, teachers and friends “provide the support and guidance necessary for the 
development and experience of autonomy.”238  Nor does this statement seem limited to the 
initial acquisition of ends that occurs in childhood. Consistent with Rawls’s statement, 
Friedman points out that the adoption of new principles or values is likely to come from 
others, and is unlikely to be newly created by the agent herself.239 Rawls’s conception of 
autonomy is therefore at least compatible with these feminist and communitarian concerns.  
As a specific response, Kymlicka explains that we only need to “understand ourselves 
to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-
examination.”240 Rawls takes Kymlicka’s response to be the appropriate defence against the 
charge that he presupposes a particular, metaphysical conception of the self.241 Rawls’s 
conception of the self requires that individuals be able to get distance from their ends in 
order to reflect on them, but not as a description of how we come to have such ends.  Rawls 
requires only the capacity to assess one’s conception of the good: to consider whether it is 
worth pursuing, and be open to changing it if she/he decides it is no longer worthwhile.242  
We are all subject to some form of socialization, and to deny this would be to deny the role 
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of our mothers, teachers, leaders etc.  Autonomy would be impossible if it required us to be 
“self-made,” but this is not what the capacity to reflect on our ends requires. 
Rawls’s objective is not to describe actual experience, but a normative conception:243 
the person as a “fully cooperating member of society,244 or in other words, persons as 
citizens.  We should note that this implies an ‘underlying self’ in the sense that political 
rights attach to the individual, so that despite changes to one’s conception of the good, 
interests, or projects, she/he continues to be the same person. But this does not require a 
particular metaphysical conception of the self.  Rather, personal identity is assumed only 
for the purpose of attributing rights, and only in a political context.245 The metaphysical 
question regarding the nature of the self is irrelevant.  It is in this sense that justice as 
fairness rests on a political, and not a metaphysical conception of the self.  
The Socialized Self  
While the capacity for a conception of the good may be compatible with 
socialization, it is in some sense dependent on receiving the proper form of socialization.  
The concern is that inadequate attention to the process of autonomy development will 
ignore the way certain kinds of socialization and social relationships can either “impede or 
enhance an agent’s capacity for autonomy.”246  Even a political conception requires a 
clarification of our acquisition of autonomy in this sense.  For example, Diana Meyers 
considers the feminist concern that the traditional gendered socialization of girls curtails 
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their development of the skills necessary to act autonomously.  These skills include an 
aptitude for considering all relevant information and feelings when envisioning possible life 
plans.  An autonomous individual must be willing to change his/her plan in light of new 
information or feelings, and “be ready to resist the unwarranted demands of other 
individuals along with conformist societal pressures.” 247 Thus, if the traditionally gendered 
family, with its distinct roles for boys and girls, includes teaching girls not to consider 
seriously life-plans outside the home, to obey her parents and not question what she is told, 
to disregard concerns for her personal desires, then the moral education she receives will 
undermine her acquisition of autonomy competency.   
This concern is reflected in Okin’s criticism of Rawls’s description of the family in 
A Theory.  More specifically, she criticizes Rawls for not requiring that the principles of 
justice as fairness apply to the family, in order to assure that the family be a just institution.  
As we have seen, the principles apply to the basic structure, of which the family is a part, 
but they do not regulate the internal life of the family. In other words, they do not apply to 
the distribution of primary goods within families. 248    
Rather, in his discussion of the family and its role in the moral education of 
children, Rawls focuses on love as the basic requirement for the acquisition of the moral 
capacities. He thinks principles of love are more appropriate than the two principles of 
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justice.249 This implies that families not characterized by justice as fairness are still 
considered just, so long as they love their children. This includes families with substantial 
inequalities, for example those in which expectations and roles are determined according to 
traditional definitions of gender. Okin does not think this is sufficient, as she contends:   
Unless the households in which children are first nurtured, and see their first examples of human interaction, 
are based on equality and reciprocity rather than on dependence and domination…how can whatever love 
they receive from their parents make up for the injustice they see before them in the relationship between 
these same parents?250  
In other words, Okin and Rawls disagree on what conditions are necessary for the 
family to be considered just. Baehr distinguishes these two senses of justice, by explaining 
that Rawls requires the family to be minimally just, and Okin requires that it be maximally 
just.  The distinction becomes apparent in Rawls’s response to Okin in “Public Reason 
Revisited.” He maintains that the family plays an important role, ensuring the moral 
development and education of children, and argues that this implies that “the family must 
be seen as a matter for political justice.”251  Okin is therefore mistaken to think that justice 
does not apply to the family. However, he specifies that the principles do not apply 
“directly to the internal life” of the family – just as they do not apply to the internal 
structure of the other associations that make up the basic structure of society.252  Rather, the 
principles impose “certain essential constraints.”253  In general, these constraints prevent 
the family or an association from violating an individual’s citizenship rights, but do not 
specify any kind of internal organisation.   
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With respect to the socialization of children, he says, “clearly, the prohibition of 
abuse and neglect of children, and much else, will, as constraints, be a vital part of family 
law.”254  But he does not think the principles of justice should necessarily regulate how we 
raise our children. These are political principles, which are relevant to individuals as 
citizens.  Thus, certain legal protections and the appropriate moral education are owed to 
children as ‘prospective citizens.’ Other than these protections, the details of the parent-
child relationship are not the concern of the state.255  
As for the division of labour and the model parents provide for their children, all the 
adult members in a family have the same basic rights and freedoms, but the principles of 
justice do not require an equal division of labour within the family.  These assurances will 
have an impact on the family to the extent that divorce must be an option, in order to 
maintain freedom of choice in relationships, and abuse is never tolerated. The work 
involved in raising children is also recognized and valued by the state, thus entitling a 
parent who stayed at home to a share in his/her partner’s income. 256  Though Rawls does 
not specify these details, it is likely that day care and maternity leave would also be made 
available in a well-ordered society.  These assurances are part of the social conditions that 
enable freedom of choice.  This is what Rawls means when he says the protection of basic 
rights and freedoms apply ‘externally’ to the family.  But Rawls maintains that “one cannot 
propose that equal division of labour in the family simply be mandated, or its absence in 
                                                                                                                                                    
253 Ibid., 159. 
254 Ibid., 160. 
255 Ibid.  
256 Ibid., 157. As Rawls puts it, “reproductive labour is social labour.”   
  
 
77
some way penalized in law for those who do not adopt it.”257  Rather, political liberalism 
tries “to reach a social condition in which the remaining division of labor is voluntary.  This 
allows in principle that considerable gendered division of labor may persist. It is only 
involuntary division of labour that is to be reduced to zero.”258 
Rawls is right about this.  It is possible for a traditionally gendered family to be just, 
and to impart autonomy competency to children.  What is important is that the division of 
labour is, as much as possible, chosen.  In agreement, Meyers explains, “in principle, the 
traditional feminine role could be the object of autonomous choice, feminists cannot 
presume to exclude it as a candidate life plan.”259  As Martha Naussbaum notes, this 
actually treats the family as having a “group right” in the sense that the family is free to 
organize its internal structure as they wish.  Just as with associations, the underlying idea is 
that the best way to protect groups is to ensure individuals’ autonomy.260  Moreover, 
Rawls’s account allows for a diversity of family units to be just, including homosexual, 
single parent, or other non-nuclear families so long as they are capable of fostering the two 
moral capacities.   
While it is unfortunate that Rawls does not describe autonomy competency with the 
same kind of detail as Meyers does, his theory is nevertheless compatible with her theory.  
It is unlikely that children will develop the two moral capacities if they are not encouraged 
to imagine different life plans, and assess their worth.  
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Here we also start to get a better picture of his specification that the conception of 
the self he is concerned with applies to individuals as citizens only. He says “we can 
distinguish between the point of view of people as citizens and their point of view as 
members of families.”261  This is not to say that the roles of family member and citizen are 
mutually exclusive.  The public and non-public are not separate spheres.  The political 
conception of justice influences the family and imposes certain restrictions on it without 
determining the particular shape it must take.262 Rawls must strike a delicate balance 
between respect for groups, and individual choice, while simultaneously protecting the 
rights and freedoms of others, particularly in the case of the family, the rights of children 
and other dependents.  Rawls has adequately negotiated the conflict, for to simply mandate 
an equal division of labour, there is the potential to deny an individual’s autonomous 
choice, and would only permit a certain type of family. 
The Constitutively Social Self  
 Feminists and communitarians have a related concern. It is likely that Sandel, for 
example, is not so concerned with the source of one’s ends as he is with the importance of a 
particular kind of end. Constitutively social ends have a social source, but are also shared 
with a community. Sandel has in mind here religious, national and tribal communities, 
whereby group membership constitutes some of an individual’s ends, and those shared ends 
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constitute his/her identity. 263 Young points to the way “highly visible social groups” such 
as ethnicity, gender, and other non-chosen groups constitute identity.264 Sandel clarifies the 
meaning of ‘socially constitutive,’ saying:  
We cannot regard ourselves as independent in this way without great cost to those loyalties and 
convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from 
understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are— as members of this family or community 
or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that revolution, as citizens of 
this republic. Allegiances such as these are more than values I happen to have or aims I ‘espouse as 
any given time.’265  
 
 Examples of shared ends include religious convictions to abstain from eating meat, 
or “family values.”  The distinction Sandel wants to make, as I understand it, is between 
decisions as a matter of preference and as a matter of identity. Constitutive communities are 
more than associations of individuals who share a common goal like employees for a 
company. Rather, such communities have a common good or end, which plays a role in 
shaping their members’ self-conceptions.  Shared ends are harder to challenge, or perhaps 
don’t make sense to challenge at all.  In other words, Sandel thinks that one cannot revise 
one’s constitutively social ends, without serious loss to one’s sense of self.   
 Similarly, Bhikhu Parekh argues that membership in a cultural community 
structures an individual’s identity by giving meaning to their ends, and constraining their 
choice of ends.266  As he explains, the particular cultural tastes, values, and habits that we 
acquire when we grow up in a particular cultural community, “strike deep roots and 
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become an inseparable part of [our] personality.”267 Like Sandel, Parekh makes a 
distinction between preferences and shared ends.  
 The impact of culture on autonomy is particularly significant in a multicultural 
society, in which there are a diversity of “needs, norms, motivations, social customs and 
patterns of behaviour.”  Parekh argues that in such a situation, “differential treatment,” may 
be necessary to achieve real equality.  Thus, a multicultural society must make 
accommodations for minority cultures, for example, in Canada exempting Sikhs from 
wearing helmets, or the Stetson in the RCMP because their culture makes it nearly 
impossible to comply with the law or policy.  There is a difference between someone who 
does not like uniforms and asking someone not to wear a turban.268  Parekh therefore 
depicts “some cultural conventions or values as so much bound up in one’s identity as to 
become beyond one’s control.”269 
 There are two ways to interpret the claim that shared ends have a special status that 
should be recognized by a conception of justice, both of which are problematic. This claim 
implies either that we cannot or should not challenge ends that are shared by a community.  
As a descriptive claim about our capacity for reflection, it is trivially false as social deviants 
and protesters for social change challenge accepted norms regularly.270  Alternatively, the 
descriptive claim might simply imply that one’s identity continues to bear “markings” from 
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one’s community, even when one rejects some of its shared ends.271  But Rawls requires 
only the capacity for a rational plan, and not to overhaul one’s entire identity.  Many 
defenders of the liberal self have responded to this view by taking up Dworkin’s argument 
that we may not be able to question all of our ends, or the entirety of our social context at 
once, but there is “no one connection or association so fundamental that it cannot be 
detached for inspection while holding others in place.”272 
 When understood as a normative claim, this position implies that it is better not to 
question shared ends, than to live a ‘detached’ lifestyle.273  As Barclay argues, it is doubtful 
that supporting shared ends is necessarily better than challenging them.  If an individual 
lives according to shared values, but would actually prefer to live differently, and thereby 
represses those desires, it is not clear why we should think that she/he has a “deeper” sense 
of self than someone who chooses to leave their community to pursue their desires.274  We 
can recognize that it is difficult to challenge or revise our constitutively social identity.  It is 
nevertheless important to maintain that individuals have the capacity to do so if they want 
or need to, without claiming that it is an easy thing to do.  While describing a cultural 
community, as a voluntary association may be inadequate, this is a perfectly appropriate 
account of the self and human capacity.  
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Illiberal Communities and the Rejection of the Autonomous Self 
In response to this critique, Rawls says that the account of the autonomous self 
refers to what he calls their public or institutional identity.  One’s status as a citizen does 
not change if an individual revises his/her life plan. It is in this public institutional context 
that we are equal, with the same basic rights and freedoms.  This is, however, distinguished 
from the non-institutional or non-public identity.  In other words, we can accept that our 
cultural community or other group affiliations may define or constitute what Rawls calls 
our non-public identity.  Rawls acknowledges the difficulty of challenging shared ends.  
Perhaps membership in a particular group may constitute who I am so strongly that, if I 
were to leave that group, I would be disoriented, and no longer know who I am.275 But my 
basic rights and freedoms are not, and should not be, contingent on my non-public identity.  
For example, my religion may constitute my identity, so that changing religions is for all 
intents and purpose equivalent to a change in identity. I may no longer be “me,” but this 
does not change my political self, or my rights.276 Compare this to Saudi Arabia, where a 
conversion from Islam means a change in public identity is marked by a loss in political 
rights, as well as a change in personal identity.277 
The distinction between public and non-public identity indicates that Rawls allows 
for the possibility that someone might have a “communitarian” view of their non-public 
self. Kymlicka thinks that the distinction is unsuccessful.  His claim is, if you are going to 
accept an account of the autonomous self for the purpose of defining a citizen’s public 
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identity, then you must also accept the autonomous self for non-public matters.278 He 
wonders why someone who has rejected an autonomous conception of his personal identity, 
would think that he has an autonomous public self.  
Kymlicka discusses religious communities that he claims do not value liberal 
autonomy to make this point.  One example is a Supreme Court case in which two members 
of the Hutterite community in Canada were expelled from their community because they 
renounced the Hutterite religion. The two members contested the principle of the Hutterite 
doctrine, which said that no one could “leave the colony without abandoning everything, 
even the clothes on their backs’.”279    As one of the justices in the case notes, this policy 
makes it virtually impossible for someone to leave the Hutterite religion.  Rawls’s political 
conception would not allow this kind of policy.   
The distinction between a public and non-public identity is supposed to enable a 
wider agreement than can be achieved with comprehensive liberalism.  Kymlicka uses this 
example to show that some groups that do not value autonomy as part of their 
comprehensive doctrine will want to restrict the basic liberties of their members, and this 
will have consequences for those members’ public identity. Kymlicka argues that only 
individuals who agree to autonomy in their personal lives will also agree to it in a political 
context; he consequently defends the view that “autonomy must be endorsed as a general 
rule.”280 Interestingly, this implies that Kymlicka would also refuse the Hutterite 
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community special minority rights, and draws the same conclusion he claims Rawls would 
have to accept. His point is that minority rights will have to be offered on the basis of the 
value of autonomy. This will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.  Here, what is 
important is that he rejects any concession to a communitarian sense of self.  
Kymlicka raises an interesting point, as he indicates how some doctrines do not 
value personal autonomy, but his is mistaken about what this example demonstrates.  The 
case involving the Hutterite community does not reveal the necessity of valuing autonomy, 
but rather, the necessity of accepting Constitutional essentials. Rawls is right to stress that 
individuals can identify deeply with their community and still accept a political conception 
of themselves for public purposes.  That is to say, one must accept that for the purpose of 
determining their political rights, they might change their mind, no matter how unlikely it 
might seem in the moment  This does include accepting political autonomy,281 but does not 
require that individuals value autonomy more generally, or accept a particular conception 
of the self.  Rather, it is to accept that we are fallible.  Similarly, it requires us to accept the 
rights of other individuals on the same basis without requiring us to agree on philosophical, 
moral or religious doctrines.  While he is correct to point out that some groups will reject 
political autonomy, Kymlicka’s insistence that a group who does not value autonomy 
generally, will not value political autonomy, fails to recognize the existence of reasonable 
non-liberal groups. This includes the major world religions, excluding their more 
fundamentalist strands, which prioritize submission to God, loyalty to their community and 
distinct roles for men and women, but nevertheless agree to political equality and political 
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autonomy.  Rawls’s political conception of the self is thus defensible and acceptable to a 
wide range of religious groups.  
Conclusion 
The critique of liberal individualism attempts to challenge Rawls’s conception of 
justice by showing that it pays inadequate attention to the role of social groups in shaping 
individual identity and overemphasizes individual rights.  It should be clear from the 
defence, however, that the critique of the self is unsuccessful. There is no question that 
social groups are important for individuals. This is a point that both communitarians and 
liberals share.  Rather, Kukathas has rightly assessed it: “what has been denied, however, is 
the proposition that fundamental moral claims are to be attached to such groups and that the 
terms of political association must be established with these particular claims in mind.”282  
Rawls’s conception of the group is not robust enough, however, to cover all relevant 
cases, and in particular fails to adequately describe cultural communities, and historically 
oppressed groups.  This does not, however, require changing Rawls’s political conception 
of the self. 
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Chapter 3 
Social Groups: Is There Room for Culture and the 
Historically Oppressed? 
   
The focus of chapter two was on Rawls’s conception of the self, and how important 
groups are for individuals. But how does Rawls view groups apart from the individuals that 
constitute them? We understand that individuals are free to join groups like the Hutterite 
community, even if the values expressed in the group differ from those expressed by 
political liberalism. But how does he view the group as a unit, independent from its 
members? What kind of recognition does a group have, and what kinds of freedoms does 
this allow the group itself to enjoy? Does he allow for any group rights, beyond the 
individual’s right to form them?  This is of particular importance for assessing the 
relationship between justice and diversity, as minority rights apply to the group. Even when 
the special rights are exercised by the individual members, they can do so because of the 
special status accorded to the group.   
In this chapter I will argue that Rawls’s theory does not properly account for 
cultural groups or oppressed groups. These groups provide examples of when group 
membership can make a claim to justice. Following chapter two I maintain that the problem 
is not with his conception of the person, but with his conception of a social group.  I go 
through Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights to show how it fails to account for the 
way some groups need political recognition in addition to the individual rights accorded to 
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all.  Nevertheless, we will see that we have to be careful about how we articulate these 
group rights, as they can give too much power to the group, and can reinforce internal 
structures of oppression.   In particular, we must make sure that group rights do not rely on 
essentialist notions of group identity or solidify identity by silencing internal dissent.  I do 
not take this to mean that we should abandon group rights. On the contrary, this set of 
problems only highlights the importance of recognition of group-based difference. Not only 
does Rawls’s treatment of groups inadequately respond to the inequalities that a minority 
group faces when compared to the majority, but also when the inequality is a question of 
minorities within minorities.  We therefore need an account of group rights that views 
groups as themselves internally diverse. Group rights should not overly penalize a 
member’s choice to reject an established norm or practice.  This is best done when the 
concerns of minorities within minorities are heard and considered.  
Associations and Communities   
In order to understand how Rawls treats groups, we should recall how he defines them. 
When Rawls recognizes social groups he interprets them as voluntary associations.  After 
having assessed his account of the self, it is clear why he has done so: he wants to 
emphasize our capacity to choose, which is essential for his account of political autonomy.  
The exception is the least advantaged group. Individuals ‘belong’ to this group for 
structural reasons.  However, the concern is the socio-economic conditions that 
disadvantage some individuals.283 It is important because it makes justice as fairness about 
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more than formal rights, and includes the adequate means for everyone to achieve their 
good.  But it does not recognize the identity of the group, and therefore does not get at the 
concerns of differentiated right theorists.  
There is the potential for a broader view of social groups more appropriate for cultures 
in Political Liberalism, in which Rawls makes the reality of reasonable pluralism his focal 
point.  As we saw, he describes this diversity as differences in comprehensive doctrines. 
While associations are usually united by a shared conception of the good, or a common 
end, a community shares a comprehensive doctrine, which organizes a consistent set of 
values. These values are prioritized in a way that facilitates a solution when they conflict.284 
This evokes the way a culture impacts most of our life, as these values, including “ideals of 
personal virtue and character…inform much of our non-political conduct.”285 A 
comprehensive doctrine could also capture the importance of history and tradition in 
shaping a cultural community, as Rawls claims it usually “belongs to, or draws upon, a 
tradition of thought and doctrine.”286 
Rawls later adds that we can be born into communities, for example, religions “and 
their distinctive cultures.”287  This indicates a significant difference from associations as it 
accounts for the way some individuals do not voluntarily join such groups.  But he 
nevertheless treats comprehensive doctrines along similar lines.  He understands a 
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community to be “a special kind of association.”288  Even if our entrance into these 
communities is not voluntary, what is important is that we can leave them voluntarily.  This 
is commonly referred to as the right to exit.  
In terms of the way society treats associations, Rawls argues for a neutral 
framework within which various associations can coexist. There are two aspects to this 
neutrality: non-interference in the organisation of the internal life of a group, and non-
interference in its survival or dissolution.  He does not spell out exactly what kind of 
freedom this gives associations, or if it allows for anything resembling the group rights 
advocated by Young and Taylor. The non-interference concept is very similar to a live-and-
let-live attitude of tolerance.289 However he specifies that an overlapping consensus is more 
stable, and more meaningful than a “modus vivendi,” as those endorsing reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines can agree on basic principles of justice.  He accordingly focuses 
on the limits to their freedom, as the association may not deny its members their basic 
individual rights.  He claims it is a separate question to ask: what principles of justice 
should regulate the internal life of an association? This is not part of political liberalism, 
which only asks such groups to find an overlapping consensus on constitutional 
essentials.290 
Rawls does hint at what this freedom for associations could include, and it is a form 
of group rights, though not as extensive as those defended by differentiated rights theorists, 
such as Young, Taylor or Kymlicka. In a discussion of religious organisations, Rawls says 
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the principles of justice do not require such institutions to be democratically governed. 
Churches, for example, are not required to elect their leaders, and the distribution of other 
positions of prestige does not need to follow any particular ‘distributive principle’.291  
In other words, associations must accept the first principle of justice as fairness.  
This is part of what qualifies a comprehensive doctrine as reasonable, since the first 
principle outlines constitutional essentials.292  The difference principle does not apply 
directly to associations, as the state does not dictate how an association should distribute 
privileges.293  In another section, Rawls adds that communities may value its members on a 
differential basis, depending on how well members achieve or work toward shared ends.294  
The freedom to distribute privilege goes so far as to allow the group’s authority figures to 
revoke all privilege, by permitting, for example, churches to ex-communicate heretics.295  
They may do so in part because the principles of justice ensure that individuals 
disadvantaged within the association always have “other alternatives open to them.”296 In 
this way, state neutrality gives groups some recognition and status, but the priority is 
always the protection of individual rights and freedoms.   
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This may seem obvious, but it is actually significant.  It indicates that associations 
are not required to promote social equality.  Okin worries that orthodox and fundamentalist 
religious groups might teach their daughters that women are inherently inferior to men.  
She thinks Rawls should be concerned about this, as it could have the effect of undermining 
an individual’s sense of herself as “a self-authenticating source of valid claims,” and thus 
her political autonomy.297   
 There is, no doubt, a problem if some citizens have equal rights, but do not regard 
themselves as worthy of those rights.  However, based on what has been said so far, Rawls 
has treated the concern adequately, as he manages the balancing act of tolerance towards 
religious difference on the one hand, and gender equality on the other.  Rawls concludes 
that it is sufficient to focus on the political realm, as this will indirectly affect 
comprehensive doctrines.  While he does not prohibit the propagation of racist and sexist 
doctrines within associations, unequal political rights such as slavery or serfdom are 
excluded from political discourse; their implementation is not an option. He hopes that 
continued talk of equality in the political realm will encourage citizens to “reinterpret their 
religious doctrine” or cause those aspects of the doctrine to diminish in popularity.298  
This brings us to how society ought to be neutral in the sense that it does not 
promote any particular conception of the good or comprehensive doctrine, and so does not 
interfere in the success or failure of a particular social group.  This is what makes Rawls’s 
recognition of social groups less extensive than what is demanded by differentiated rights 
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theorists.  In his early writings, he explains that the government should be neutral between 
different conceptions of the good, “not in the sense that there is an agreed public measure 
of intrinsic value or satisfaction with respect to which all these conceptions come out equal, 
but in the sense that they are not evaluated at all from a social standpoint.”299 Similarly, in 
A Restatement, Rawls argues that the state should not interfere in the success or failure of a 
comprehensive doctrine beyond the guarantee of basic rights and freedoms.300 
In other words, if a comprehensive doctrine demands the infringement of individual 
rights in order to survive, it is considered unreasonable.301 Rawls considers the issue of 
certain religious groups and their desire to separate themselves from the modern world.302  
Such religious communities want to shelter their children from the ‘corruption of the 
modern world’.  Regardless, political liberalism requires that children be equipped to 
understand their rights, and, in particular, to understand that when they are old enough they 
are legally free to leave their community.  This policy is meant to ensure that membership 
“is not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear of punishment for offences 
that are only considered offences in their religious sect.”303  The conflict between the 
demands of isolationists and the requirements of political liberalism is highlighted in a few 
contemporary legal cases.  It is reflected in the Amish community’s request to have their 
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children removed from school before the age of sixteen.  This is not necessarily 
problematical, so long as they show that the children have received adequate civic 
education before they quit school. But the Amish would not be permitted to completely 
shelter their children, thereby preventing them from learning anything about the modern 
world. 
An example of this type of total segregation is the curricula taught in some 
Christian fundamentalist schools in the United States. In these programs, Christianity is 
taught as the “only way.” Questioning the teacher is not permitted. Jeff Spinner-Halev adds 
a concern regarding the homogeneity of the student body, as they will not likely be exposed 
to a significant diversity of ideas or lifestyles, or get much practice cooperating with others 
who are different.304   
 The conflict between political liberalism and religious group rights in this case 
results from the possibility that civic education for all children may encourage individuals 
to leave their community in greater numbers than in cases where the community has 
complete control over the education of their children.  Such a conflict may indeed threaten 
the survival of the community.  Nevertheless, there is some room for accommodation, as 
this concern does not necessarily exclude the possibility of private, religious schooling, 
although it does require some common curricula across different forms of education. We 
should not take this to imply that Rawls believes that communities are without value.  On 
the contrary, he says that the passing away of communities and different ways of life is 
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something to lament.  But civic education is owed to children as future citizens.  This 
reflects an idea that has already been discussed in depth in this thesis: political rights and 
freedoms are fundamental and universal.  The demise of a culture is regrettable, but it does 
not trump individual rights.   
I agree with Rawls that civic education for all children is a reasonable requirement, 
but I would argue that while this model of neutrality is acceptable for dealing with some 
issues that result from divergent religious doctrines, it is inappropriate for some cultural 
communities and historically oppressed groups.  Note that Christianity is the dominant 
religion in the United States; so Christian fundamentalists are not what writers generally 
have in mind when they discuss multiculturalism, though fundamentalists may also be 
affected by multicultural policies. The Christian ‘way of life’ is not threatened in the United 
States, so Christian fundamentalists will find some of their practices and beliefs supported, 
even if other requests are restricted.  Minority cultures or subcultures, in contrast, might 
find their entire way of life threatened.  In light of this, we can see that there are two 
problems with the model of state neutrality. First, as Kymlicka convincingly argues, in 
some cases we do have a reason to be concerned about the survival of a culture, and should 
take measures to protect it.  Second, in a multicultural society, the state cannot always be 
neutral with respect to different cultural communities.305  Therefore, not only does the state 
have a reason to be concerned about the survival of such communities but the state also 
(perhaps unintentionally) contributes to a minority culture’s demise. This makes the state’s 
treatment of different cultures an issue of equality, which a conception of justice should 
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consider. Young adds that this not only applies to culture, it applies wherever structures 
exist that privilege some social groups over others:   
“If particular gender, racial or ethnic groups have greater economic or political power, their group 
related experiences, points of view, or cultural assumptions will tend to become the norm, biasing 
the standard procedures of achievement and inclusion that govern social, political and economic 
institutions.”306 
 
In such situations, a purportedly group-neutral approach only denies the way the 
majority perspective is taken to be the norm.   
Recognition of Cultural Groups 
In the previous chapter we saw that Rawls’s theory can leave room for the 
possibility that we identify closely with a given culture.  This is because he understands 
that any association can be important for individuals, therefore he does not give culture a 
unique status.  A cultural community is just a ‘special kind of association’. We also saw 
that most critics focus on the voluntary nature of the association model as the problem for 
an interpretation of culture.  They tend to emphasize that we do not create cultural groups, 
and that we cannot leave them in the same way that we can leave associations.307 While I 
agree that cultural communities are misunderstood if they are thought of as associations, 
such assessments focus on the way culture limits an individual’s capacity for autonomy, 
which I maintain is not a problem in Rawls’s conception of justice.   
Kymlicka’s argument for multicultural rights does not rest solely on the premise 
that culture is a constituent of individual identity. According to him, the protection of a 
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cultural community is a precondition for liberty. Our freedom to accept or reject various 
conceptions of the good requires a range of options, which our cultural community 
provides. We become aware of these options through the medium of our language and 
history.  Our capacity for autonomy, and our freedom of choice is dependent, then, on our 
cultural structures.308 Thus, while the principles of justice enable diversity to flourish by 
protecting the basic rights and liberties of individuals as citizens, Kymlicka demonstrates 
that justice will also require special minority rights to protect some cultural structures in 
order to enable the exercise of those freedoms.  
Note, however, that this does not challenge Rawls’s conception of the self.  
Kymlicka is concerned with culture to the extent that it is an individual’s “context of 
choice.”  Based on this definition, culture lays out in front of us a variety of possibilities 
and meanings, which can be taken up, reflected on, challenged and modified.  He focuses 
on culture as a structure within which we choose our rational life plans.  He thus 
distinguishes his sense of culture from the common usage that refers to the particular 
character of a culture.309 The particular “character” of a culture is important to his account 
to the extent that he restricts his discussion to societal cultures, or “a culture which provides 
its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, 
including social, education, religious, recreational, and economic life.”310 Thus, even 
though his emphasis is always on culture as a context of choice, it is the shared history and 
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meanings of a cultural group that give content to a particular context of choice and explain 
why individuals have a claim to protect “their own” culture.311  
The problem is that, in a multicultural society, the survival of a minority culture can 
be threatened.312  The focus on societal cultures means Kymlicka is primarily concerned 
with nations, or well-established historical communities that are “more or less 
institutionally complete” and geographically concentrated.313 Yet, despite their 
establishment, in a multinational state there is a dominant culture, and the survival of 
national minorities is at risk. Consider the situation of the Aboriginal communities in 
Canada.  Historically, where there was commercial interest in a particular area inhabited by 
Aboriginals, the actions of the companies involved led to the disintegration of the 
Aboriginal community.314  Other examples of national minorities include the numerous 
Indigenous communities around the world, Quebec, Puerto Rico, Basque territories and 
Catalonia.  
The concept of the group as association does not capture the way in which culture is 
one’s context of choice. While Kymlicka focuses on autonomy in general, his argument 
shows how one’s specific culture is necessary for Rawls’s political autonomy.  The 
capacity to form a rational life plan is one of the moral powers required for political 
autonomy and citizenship. When the existence of a cultural structure is threatened, it is 
insufficient to simply regret its extinction. The near complete dropout rate of Aboriginals in 
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integrated schools demonstrates how a vulnerable cultural structure erodes individual 
members’ ability to form a conception of the good as opposed to merely eliminating a 
particular choice.315  
The Impossibility of Neutrality   
Inattention to culture does not come, as communitarians allege, from a 
misunderstanding of how important culture is for individuals.  Rather, the reason for the 
absence of culture in Rawls’s work flows from an assumption that a political community 
will be culturally homogenous.  Rawls never says this explicitly, but there are a few 
passages that suggest it. Rawls puts culture and society together when he discusses the 
difficulty that individuals experience when they leave their country because of how 
ingrained their culture is and how deeply it can shape someone’s life.316   
Rawls’s treatment of culture is most likely the result of his assumption that a society 
is self-sufficient and individuals enter it only by birth and exit only by death. This 
assumption is supposed to restrict the question of justice to the relationship between the 
individual and the state.  It is meant to force us to take seriously the idea that we must live 
in accordance with the principles we choose, by removing the possibility of leaving if we 
are unsatisfied with the results.  Once we get this first question right, we can then consider 
questions regarding international justice, and the related issue of immigration. 317  This 
                                                                                                                                                    
314 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 148. 
315 Ibid., 145. 
316 Rawls and Kelly, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 94. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal 
Theory of Minority Rights, 86. 
317 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 40-41.  
  
 
99
assumption has unacceptable consequences, however, as the reality of cultural diversity 
present in most countries makes the kind of neutrality Rawls describes impossible.  
In a multicultural society, the state cannot be neutral with respect to culture, as it 
can with religion.  While it is possible “for a state not to have an established church,”318 
political functions and deliberations must take place in a particular language and there is a 
limit as to how many languages can be officially recognized and used in public forums.319 
The government will similarly support some cultures and disadvantage others through its 
choice of “internal boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols.”320 Culture is embodied 
in public institutions, making it impossible for the state to be neutral in this respect.321   
This implies that national minorities demanding multicultural rights322 are not 
seeking special privilege.  Rather, “they are simply asking for the same sort of rights taken 
for granted by the majority culture.”323  Rawls’s theory should be concerned about this kind 
of injustice.  This is about justice between groups. To reiterate, because his conception of 
the group is limited to associations, his theory falls short here.   
While the absence of cultural diversity is highly problematic for Rawls’s theory, 
Kymlicka extends Rawls’s theory to include minority rights.  He connects these rights with 
Rawls’s theory of unfair disadvantage, as they would help mitigate the inequality that 
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results from the way the basic structure disadvantages members of a minority group.324 
Recall that Rawls’s theory is intended to mitigate “the effects of natural accident and social 
circumstance.”325 As Putnam explains, “Rawls assumes that the least advantaged group is 
economically disadvantaged.”326 Rather than abandon Rawls’s principles of justice, we 
ought to pay attention to the ‘multiplicity of least advantaged positions’.327 
At this point, we should be clear about the kind of rights Kymlicka thinks 
legitimately protect a cultural structure, and how these connect to Rawls’s conception of 
justice.  Because he focuses primarily on national minorities, he advocates self-government 
rights, giving them some territorial and political autonomy.328 For example, he argues that 
in Southern Canada, non-Aboriginals should be prohibited from living on or buying land on 
the reserves. In the North, his concern is over protecting resources from temporary workers, 
who might form the majority while they are working there.  This vulnerability justifies 
denying non-Aboriginals the right to vote, unless they meet a minimum residency 
requirement.329  He also advocates a right to guaranteed representation in the dominant 
political institutions, to ensure their interests are heard by the majority in the larger political 
context.330 Rawls’s work could thus be expanded to include this category of minority right, 
by considering the perspective of national minorities as an instantiation of the least-
advantaged group, because their context of choice is threatened. 
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Immigrant cultures can also be threatened in a multicultural society.  If special 
measures are not in place to protect their culture, the language of recent immigrants is often 
no longer spoken in the home by the third generation.331  But these are not societal cultures 
because there is no institutional structure in place.  In many cases, immigrants chose to 
leave a country where their cultural structure was stable. It therefore does not make sense to 
give immigrant groups rights to self-government.  In any case, this is not what they 
request.332  Rather they are concerned about fair treatment, as the state can be non-neutral 
with respect to such groups as well.333  The recognition and special rights they want are 
what Kymlicka calls “polyethnic rights,” which consist primarily of exemptions from laws 
that penalize and policies that encourage bilingualism.  These rights facilitate their 
integration into the new country, by enabling them to maintain their distinct culture while 
participating in the dominant economic, political and social institutions.334  For example, 
public holidays reflecting the calendar of the dominant religion unfairly disadvantage 
groups whose holy days do not correspond.  In these cases, neutrality is not impossible, but 
it can only be achieved by recognizing the diversity of cultural groups that exist within a 
given territory, including attention to the way the dominant culture is embodied in 
institutions.  Without attention to groups, the state will tacitly support a particular 
comprehensive doctrine: that of the dominant group.   
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This is the position held by Gerard Bouchard and Charles Taylor in their 
justification for reasonable accommodations in Quebec. Their definition of neutrality 
corresponds nicely to Rawls’s stance of non-interference, especially given his account of 
reasonable pluralism.  Describing the standpoint of the Quebec government, they explain:  
The secular State must be neutral in respect of all religions…it must maintain its position of 
neutrality when faced with deep-seated moral convictions, whether they are religious or secular. 
However, the secular State is based on a moral code and on certain principles that are non-
negotiable…Ideally, all citizens must share these same principles and political moral code, although 
their deep-seated convictions may differ.335  
 
That this objective might require the reasonable accommodation of difference 
through policies that resemble Kymlicka’s polyethnic rights is telling. It implies that 
polyethnic rights are consistent with, and indeed required by Rawls’s position of neutrality.  
This list of minority rights is meant to be provisional, as there are cultural groups 
that do not fit into either category of national minority or voluntary immigrant; for 
example, refugees and African Americans.336  Nor does this include other social groups 
such as women, gays and lesbians, and the disabled, as they do not constitute cultures so 
much as “cut across cultures.”337  Agreeing that these groups are left out on this ‘societal 
cultural,’ model of group rights, Young advocates a more capacious view.  She emphasizes 
how all historically oppressed groups require recognition of their difference in order for 
justice to be done. Much like recent immigrants, these groups suffer inequality compared to 
the dominant group.  This requires attention to the processes that disadvantage oppressed 
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social groups, such as normalization, marginalization and exploitation.  This will not occur 
through a difference-blind approach, for “to remove unjust inequality it is necessary 
explicitly to recognize group difference and either compensate for disadvantage, revalue 
some attributes, positions, or actions, or take special steps to meet the needs and empower 
members of disadvantaged groups.”338  
I agree with Young that attention to groups should not be limited to cultures.  But 
we can move past the limitation of the societal cultural model if we focus not on the 
examples Kymlicka gives, but on his argument for differentiated rights.  What Kymlicka 
added to Rawls’s treatment of groups is a method for determining whether a group has a 
legitimate claim to minority rights.  The remedy might not always be the same, but in each 
case a disadvantaged group could demonstrate the inequality that exists, how they are 
vulnerable to the majority, and how this vulnerability threatens the autonomy of their 
members, in order to show that appropriate measures should be taken.339  This avoids 
Rawls’s concern that attention to all social groups is an impossible task, as Kymlicka’s 
proposal identifies which social groups are relevant.  
Working within a Rawlsian framework, it should not be surprising that we will find 
many similarities in the ways in which Rawls and Kymlicka treat groups. The principle 
difference is that Rawls’s liberalism lets minority cultures die out, while Kymlicka gives 
some of them a bona fide legal status. At this point, we have to ask: does giving legal 
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recognition to cultural groups go too far in the opposite direction?  The coherence of 
minority rights with individual rights is insufficient, however, as the existence of structures 
of inequality internal to cultural groups is sometimes used to discredit special measures to 
preserve these cultures. As Kukathas argues, “The divided nature of cultural communities 
strengthens the case for not thinking in terms of cultural rights.”340  In general, this position 
claims that minority rights are not justified if they simply reinforce a different inequality.  
More specifically, Okin worries that rights for cultural groups gives power to male 
members as “patterns of socialization, rituals, matrimonial customs and other cultural 
practices…make it virtually impossible for women to choose to live independently of men, 
to be celibate or lesbian, or to decide not to have children.”341  In other words, she worries 
that cultural practices often directly limit a woman’s freedom of choice.  She lists 
“clitoridectomy, polygamy, the marriage of children or marriages otherwise coerced” as 
examples of practices that should not be accommodated through polyethnic rights, because 
of the harm they could cause to women.   
Despite the sensationalism of these examples, and the scant research used to support her 
claims,342 within the liberal framework she is right to demand that the resolution of one 
inequality not simply reinforce a different one.  Cass Sunstein examines cases of gender 
discrimination in religions, finding: “certain Jewish schools refuse to admit girls,” “a 
Catholic university refuses to tenure several women teachers,” and “Mormon 
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employers…refuse to hire women for certain jobs.”343 This starts to gives us a picture of 
more widespread discrimination. 
Cultural and religious groups are not only divided by gender.  Phillips adds a concern 
for the way minority rights might oppress the poor, children, and gays and lesbians who 
make up other internal minorities.344 As Joseph Raz explains, in many cultures, “repression 
of homosexuality is widespread…as is blindness to the needs of many people whose 
physical abilities or disabilities, or psychological needs, fail to conform to the approved 
ways of the community.”345  Children are particularly vulnerable, if a request for an 
exemption from laws has the effect of limiting their autonomy by emphasising loyalty and 
obedience, as we saw with the examples discussed at the beginning of this chapter.346 
For the remainder of this chapter I will examine whether these concerns regarding the 
fair treatment of internal minorities undermine Kymlicka’s approach to minority rights.   
The concern can be divided into three related issues:  First, does Kymlicka’s argument for 
minority right conceptualize culture in a way that is too rigid to allow for a group’s self-
transformation?  Second, does it reinforce an internal inequality? Finally, does it represent 
the culture as a unified whole, thereby silencing internal movement for change? Though it 
is a legitimate concern, I will argue that the problem of internal minorities does not support 
a rejection of minority rights.  Indeed, Rawls’s conception of voluntary social groups and 
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his position of non-interference will be subject to the same sort of problems.  Instead of 
rejecting minority rights, I find Kymlicka makes important progress in this area.  The 
minority rights he defends are justified because they are good for individuals.  He thus 
advocates ‘weak multiculturalism’, meaning that he pays attention to who bears the costs of 
the minority right.347.  
I agree with Kymlicka’s project to support both minority rights to protect the group, 
and respect the individual’s right to revise or reject a particular cultural practice, though I 
emphasize Rawls’s political liberalism as a preferable foundation for minority rights, than 
the comprehensive liberalism Kymlicka endorses. Otherwise Kymlicka’s theory is 
relatively impervious to the problem of internal minorities, with the exception of the veto 
rights he gives to national minorities as a part of their self-government rights.  However, 
attenuating this aspect of his theory does not require eliminating minority rights altogether.  
Rejecting a Solidified Notion of Culture 
One of the ways in which recognition of cultural groups can be problematical for 
internal minorities is if it reifies an essentialist view of cultural identity.  As we saw in the 
second chapter, Rawls’s treatment of groups cannot be labelled essentialist.  It is not an 
issue for Rawls’s treatment of groups because their identity is not recognized so much as 
the right individuals have to come together and work towards a common goal.  There is no 
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need to distinguish individuals according to groups, except to identify the least advantaged, 
to ensure they have the means to achieve substantive equality.        
Some writers worry that land rights appeal to a romanticized image of indigenous 
groups as having a special relationship with nature. This undermines the identity of 
Aboriginals who live in the city.  In a related manner, some environmentalists have urged 
that reservations should be “protected” from modernization.348 This similarly has the effect 
of essentializing their identity, and can make change difficult – both symbolically in terms 
of how the identity of Aboriginals is viewed by members and non-members, and 
concretely, in terms of modernizing life for those living on the reservations, or by 
discouraging those who wish to live or work outside the reservation.  
This concern emanates in part from the tendency for recognition to protect already-
existing identities, especially given Kymlicka’s focus on societal cultures and their well-
established institutions.  These minority rights are intended to be fixed in law, which has 
the power and tendency to “solidif[y] the group into something very substantial.”349 How 
much room does he leave for a culture to change itself, or to recognize “newly constituted 
and recreated identities” that have yet to be formed?350 
Kymlicka avoids the problem of essentialism by focusing on the structure of a culture 
as opposed to its character.  As a result, there is no particular trait, practice or ritual 
necessary to define a culture. Rather, he is concerned with the institutions and the language 
through which one’s culture is expressed.  That is to say, he seeks to protect the places 
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where ceremonies can be held, schools where ideas and practices can be taught, and 
governments or forums to choose community leaders.  The particular practices can always 
be challenged but the institutional structure must be there.  Kymlicka concludes that this 
leaves room for the group to transform itself. 
Internal Structures of Inequality  
Clearly, Kymlicka’s conception of multiculturalism is intended to protect a minority 
group’s institutions when they are vulnerable to the majority’s decisions. He calls these 
rights “external protections,” because they limit the rights of the majority, and distinguishes 
them from “internal restrictions,” which limit the rights of the members of the minority.351 
Like Rawls, Kymlicka specifies that he does not defend the kind of internal restrictions that 
could conflict with constitutional essentials.  Traditions of arranged marriages, or practices 
of clitoridectomy – when these are imposed on members who do not want to partake in 
such practices – are not justified simply because they are part of a particular culture’s 
traditions or history.352  
As part of the protection of rights and freedoms for the members of a minority 
group, Kymlicka adds that the minority groups must respect other liberal principles such as 
gender equality and individual autonomy to be eligible for special rights.  Illiberal groups, 
then, should be tolerated without imposing liberal values on them, but they will not be 
eligible for minority rights.  The group rights Kymlicka defends are therefore only 
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somewhat more extensive than Rawls’s.  Indeed, his distinction between internal 
restrictions and external protections is supposed to eliminate all costs to internal minorities 
by disqualifying some claims altogether.  
Okin thinks that if we take this distinction seriously – as she does – then we would 
have to conclude that no cultural rights are justifiable. She claims no culture “passes the no 
sex discrimination test” so his distinction is bound to fail.  In fact, she finds that most 
claims for special cultural rights concern gendered issues and protection for that culture 
may reinforce an internal structure of inequality, as “most cultures have as one of their 
principle aims the control of women by men.”353   
To be clear, Kymlicka’s requirement that a culture accept liberal principles of 
autonomy and gender equality applies to self-government rights, as these rights transfer 
power to political subunits.  National minorities must be liberal, because self-government 
rights gives leaders increased authority over their members, while this legal-jurisdictional 
authority does not accompany polyethnic rights.  Agreeing with Kymlicka, it would not 
make sense, for instance, to deny Sikhs the exemption from helmet laws on the grounds of 
gender inequality within the Sikh community.  That sort of exemption does not reinforce an 
internal inequality. 
However, Kymlicka’s distinction is likely to permit some polyethnic rights that 
facilitate the kind of practices Okin is concerned about, so long as they are the result of 
autonomous choice. Generally, Kymlicka supports the exemptions or privileges necessary 
to maintain a cultural practice for those who chose to uphold it but also supports individuals 
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who choose to reject it. Polygamy, for example, does not undermine anyone’s basic rights, 
so long as the parties are fully consenting. As Parekh points out, wearing the hijab, 
arranged marriages and cliterodectomy are in some cases “complex autonomous” acts.354   
Yet Okin thinks no support should be given to facilitate these practices, as those 
who engage in them often “openly acknowledge that the customs persist at men’s 
insistence” and that they are intended to control women.355 She even goes so far as to reject 
the idea that illiberal groups should be tolerated.356 Not only does she oppose exemptions 
from laws, it seems she would also support proactive policies like the law passed in 
Denmark in 2005 which bans the Niqab or Burka in any public space, as well as the 
policies that ban the hijab in public schools, even though this form of dress did not 
contradict any prior laws or policies.357 
Note that Okin’s position is not satisfied by Rawls’s liberalism either.  Rawls’s also 
permits discriminatory practices within religious organisations, such as those described by 
Sunstein.  As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, Okin is concerned about this too. 
This is because Okin advocates a form of comprehensive liberalism, as opposed to Rawls’s 
political liberalism.  As Nussbaum explains, “It seems to her half-hearted for the state to 
endorse equal citizenship and not to construct, and vigorously support, the rest of a 
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comprehensive way of life that protects it by teaching a comprehensive doctrine of sex 
equality.”358 
Rawls’s political liberalism is preferable for two reasons.  First, we would not be 
able to form an overlapping consensus on the metaphysical equality of men and women.  
As a result, enforcing such liberal principles on non-liberal, though reasonable groups 
would require the use of the state’s coercive apparatus.  Secondly, and more importantly, as 
we saw in the second chapter, political liberalism respects the possibility that an individual 
might choose to live a “communitarian” life; characterized by obedience and submission, 
so long as they agree to the value of political autonomy.   
Okin’s position stems from an erroneous assumption that all women experience 
their culture in the same way.359 Take the hijab for example.  In the sociological literature, 
it is described as both a “symbol of women’s subordination,” and “an expression of 
women’s agency.”360  Wearing the veil was used as a sign of protest against the Shah 
government in Iran.361  Other women choose to wear the veil against the advice of their 
husbands or families, making it difficult to see the veil as necessarily reflecting the 
wearer’s passivity.  As part of the mosque movement in Egypt, it is worn as a sign of 
submission to God, and not to men. 362  The autonomy involved in the decision to live a life 
of devotion and submission to God, and to a patriarchal tradition, is somewhat paradoxical, 
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but not unlike the example of the traditional woman discussed in the previous chapter.  It is 
possible for a religious, pious life to be the result of critical reflection on the kind of life 
one wants to live. 
We must pause for a moment, as Kymlicka also claims to advocate a comprehensive 
liberalism that values individual autonomy, as we saw at the end of the previous chapter, 
with his critique of Rawls’s public/non-public distinction.  Kymlicka’s theory is actually 
more consistent with political liberalism. For while the value of individual autonomy forms 
the foundation of his theory of minority rights, he separates this from the question of how a 
liberal government should treat illiberal groups, who do not share liberal values.363  As we 
have already seen, he advocates tolerance, and so has the same outcome as Rawls’s 
political liberalism.  Kymlicka also considers non-liberal groups to be eligible for 
polyethnic rights, in the form of external protections.  He also clearly does not want to deny 
that some might choose to uphold one’s cultural traditions.  
Building a defence of minority rights on Rawls’s political liberalism is preferable to 
comprehensive liberalism, which rules out some lives as not worth living. It also explains 
why polyethnic rights are not contingent on the liberalism of the group, and why illiberal 
groups should be tolerated, though not accommodated. More importantly, it explains why 
the existence of hierarchies within a culture does not undermine Kymlicka’s minority 
rights. For unless the minority right entails giving increased authority to a community’s 
leaders, as is the case with self-government rights and internal restrictions, the organisation 
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of the group is irrelevant.  There is nothing incoherent about supporting the survival of a 
culture by providing legal exemptions that permit different cultural practices while 
simultaneously supporting an individual’s refusal to partake in those practices.364   
Consensus  
Okin uses such controversial examples, in order to emphasize how culture practices 
can be supported by the state even if a large portion of the minority group’s members 
contests them.365  She is concerned that minority rights silence dissenters, who seek to 
change discriminatory practices. Anne Phillips similarly considers how “discourses of 
culture allow the more powerful members of a group to codify what are normally changing 
and contested practices, thereby establishing their own authoritative readings that they 
employ to enforce conformity among group members.”366 The acceptance and support of 
polygamy for example, “legitimates multiple wives for men”367 and undermines the 
criticism of women in Africa and France.   
When Kymlicka says minority rights protect what the members want, does this 
really speak for everyone in the group? In the discussion of indigenous groups, he says, 
“they demand the right to decide for themselves what aspects of the outside world they will 
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incorporate into their cultures.”368  In discussing the jurisdiction of the Pueblo Tribal 
Council, he says they “might well wish to put their trust in tribal courts. If that is the 
consensus amongst the Pueblo, then surely it should be respected.”369  We have to ask, 
when does such a consensus ever occur, and how it is determined. When the decision-
making procedures within a community are not democratic, there may well be a consensus, 
but in appearance only.  When there is no consensus, there is a risk that dissenting groups 
will be oppressed.  For example, when cultural leaders seek to maintain traditional 
practices, it is a common strategy to portray reformers as ‘self seeking,’ or as tempted by 
the majority’s culture. 370  As a result, we have to be careful of the way the minority rights 
discourse can be used by a cultural elite to repress movements for change.   
To illustrate a thorny instance of this, I will examine the case of Santa Clara Pueblo 
v. Martinez.  In the 1930s, the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribal Council had stated, that if a 
female member marries outside of the tribe, her children would be denied Indian status, 
while the children of a man in the same scenario would be fully recognized.  In the 1970s, 
the issue went through the various levels of adjudication when Julia Martinez’s children 
were permitted to live on the reservation, but were not recognized as Pueblo Indians, 
because Julia Martinez had married a Navaho man. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled in 
favour of the Tribe, claiming it was necessary for the “Tribe’s cultural survival,” to permit 
                                                 
368 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 104. 
369 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 197.  
370 Yael Tamir, "Siding with the Underdogs," in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, ed. Joshua Cohen, 
Matthew Howard, and Martha Craven Nussbaum(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 48. 
  
 
115
them to determine their own membership policies, even if these are discriminatory.371 
While he claims that the minority rights he defends would not permit these internal 
restrictions, Kymlicka agreed with the Supreme Court’s decision, claiming that the Tribe’s 
policies should nevertheless be respected as an example of non-interference.372  
In some ways, this is a particularly difficult example, and most likely constitutes 
what Kymlicka calls an extreme case.  Either the self-government of the Pueblo would be 
undermined, or the state would support “the systematic maltreatment” of women.373 In 
either case, a disadvantaged group would lose out. Moreover, Young’s more extensive view 
cannot help us here, as she also concentrates on inequality between groups, as opposed to 
within groups; thus the problem appears highly specific and potentially entrenched.374  
In other ways, the Pueblo case is also typical of a group that lacks consensus.  The 
example shows that Kymlicka’s account will tend to support the view of the culture as 
defined by that culture’s elite.  As we saw, Kymlicka allows individuals to reinterpret their 
culture for themselves. His distinction prohibits multicultural policies from being used to 
force particular cultural practices on its members.  Nevertheless, if the group decides to 
expel the individual as a consequence of their decision, this too must be supported.  Therein 
lies the rub, as this usually means siding with the elite, whose practices may solidify 
identities in a contestable fashion.  
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We might think that Rawls avoids the problem of internal dissent by focusing 
purely on citizenship rights.  However, his inadequate conception of the group leaves this 
concern unresolved as well.  Phillips discusses a case involving the expulsion of a leader 
from the Scouts when the Boy Scout Council discovered he was gay.  Once in court, the 
case revealed significant internal disagreement over the discriminatory policy.  The 
Supreme Court nevertheless sided with the group’s leadership, referencing that freedom of 
association “protects a minority association’s right to be distinct from the majority.”375 This 
demonstrates that even the clearest example of a voluntary organisation has an internal 
structure, and the position of the leaders tend to be considered representative of the group.   
By focusing on a shared system of beliefs and values, comprehensive doctrines also 
emphasize strong homogeneity within the group.  As we saw, Rawls, like Kymlicka, 
permits communities to establish their own membership policies, which may be 
discriminatory, and gives community leaders the right to expel individuals. This makes 
some sense for religions, when they are defined by belief systems.  Indeed, there is a sense 
in which an individual is no longer Catholic if they do not believe the core tenets of 
Catholicism.  Similarly to Kymlicka, this concept most likely allows for the reinterpretation 
of a doctrine, whereby individuals can reject some elements and modify others.  But the 
situation becomes more problematical when the group in question is the culture an 
individual enters by birth.376  The best Rawls’s theory can do under the present 
circumstances is to similarly allow the Pueblo to exclude the Martinez family from the 
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Tribe, even though the justification of their exclusion has nothing to do with belief, but was 
the result of an individual’s marriage choice.  
While this may appear disappointing, there is one significant difference in 
Kymlicka’s theory, which has the potential to silence internal minorities in a more profound 
way. As part of their right to self-government, Kymlicka does not think the Tribal leaders’ 
decisions should be subject to judicial review.377 Young similarly supports giving groups 
“veto power regarding specific policies that affect a group directly.”378 She cites, as her 
example, giving Aboriginal groups veto power over land use for reservations. This would 
have prevented the Martinez case from going through the American legal system. 
This is a mistake, as it gives unnecessary authority to the community leaders.  If 
individuals or minorities within a group claim their rights are not respected, their claims 
should be heard. There is no reason to suppose this would diminish the external protections 
accorded to the group, as the criticism would have to come from a member.   
We should also note the way constitutional essentials generally protect the voice of 
dissenters within minority groups.  Vulnerable subgroups and individual members within a 
minority culture have the right to free speech and protection from violence. They have a 
safe environment in which they can express their views, no matter how much they diverge 
from the views held by their community leaders.  Thus, organizations like Women Living 
Under Muslim Laws, who argue for a more progressive treatment of women, based on a 
reinterpretation of Islamic texts, are free from censorship.  Individuals who depart from 
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their communities’ accepted norms, for example by refusing to wear the veil, are protected 
under the law.   
The diversity within a culture does not necessarily undermine Kymlicka’s argument 
for minority rights.  It is a legitimate concern, and it seems the exemption from judicial 
review attached to the self-government rights he defends unnecessarily gives excess 
privilege to the leaders of a community, potentially harming sub-groups.  But this can 
easily be denied without also denying self-government rights.  Moreover, this problem is 
only associated with self-government rights, as polyethnic rights do not transfer authority to 
the community’s leaders.   
Conclusion 
What does all this imply for Rawls’s conception of justice? Rawls correctly stresses 
that individual rights and freedoms are basic, and not up for discussion. However, the state 
must take measures to ensure that it does not unfairly disadvantage some minority cultures 
or oppressed groups, and it cannot simply dissociate itself from these concerns.  In doing 
so, it reinforces already existing structures of inequality. Kymlicka’s defence of 
multiculturalism is particularly useful here, as it makes it possible to see minority rights as 
an extension of Rawls’s conception of justice, necessary to achieving real equality.  By 
maintaining that individuals remain the priority in the context of group rights, Kymlicka’s 
account handles the concerns regarding internal minorities. Though his defence of external 
protection for cultural groups that coexist with rights for individuals is more consistent with 
Rawls’s political liberalism, than with comprehensive liberalism. This allows us to reject 
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the imposition of cultural practices or traditions on unwilling participants, while 
maintaining that obedience to culture, and gendered roles can be the object of autonomous 
choice.  One element of Kymlicka’s minority rights that must be rejected, is the exemption 
from judicial review, or veto power attributed to self-government. This goes beyond 
external protections, by limiting the movements for change that occur within the group.  
Removing this aspect does not deny the right to self-government as a whole.  Group 
protections can be consistent with individual rights, though it is a careful balance. 
 
 
 
  
Conclusion 
After this extensive examination of diversity and justice, we see that we must 
distinguish the conceptual from the application.  For as a method for reasoning about 
principles of justice, we should abstract from group-based differences, even though this is 
not the case in the application of those principles, which does require attention to 
difference.  
Despite the arguments presented by the critiques discussed in this thesis, Rawls’s 
original position should not be abandoned, nor is the abstraction of the original position 
impossible. The veil of ignorance does not require us to imagine ourselves as disembedded 
and disembodied reasoners, as the parties in the original position are situated by their 
capacities for a conception of the good and a sense of justice.  While I suggest that the 
assumption that ability “fall within the normal range” be dropped to remove any able-
bodied bias, this does not effect the construction of the original position, or the outcome of 
the principles in any important way. Rather, it emphasizes a more inclusive perspective 
behind the veil of ignorance, and widens the least advantaged group to include more 
difficult cases of disability.  
In response to those who accept its feasibility but reject its desirability, I argue that 
the original position offers a powerful tool for combating bias and discrimination, by 
imagining ourselves behind a veil of ignorance. It justifies a fair arrangement where justice 
must pay attention to structural disadvantages, and makes agreement possible. That said 
there are limitations to the original position. Critiques arguing for a method of moral 
dialogue as an alternative to the veil of ignorance correctly indicate that there is no way to 
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verify whether our reasons are free of bias. Nor can we be sure that we have come up with 
the best possible arrangement, or that we fully understand what it is like to be the least 
advantaged of society.  Nevertheless, these limits are acceptable:  we can accept that 
developing a conception of justice is an ongoing process.  Indeed this idea underlies 
Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium.  Incorporating elements of moral dialogue 
through reflective equilibrium can help improve a conception of justice, as we get a better 
understanding of the experience of the least advantaged, as well as the social structures that 
disadvantage individuals differently.  None of this suggests abandoning the abstraction of 
the original position, which remains a powerful conceptual tool for arriving at agreement 
and combating bias and discrimination.  
In this thesis we also discover that the question regarding the recognition of groups 
in the application of the principles of justice, is not about denying or affirming attention to 
social group difference. Rather, the question refers to the kind of recognition we should 
give to groups.  As we have seen, the ‘difference blind approach’ does give some protection 
and recognition to groups and fosters various forms of diversity by protecting and 
recognizing individual choice. This conception of the group has the added advantage of 
avoiding the problems of essentialism, which plague other conceptions of groups.  
Therefore, the charge that A Theory is difference blind refers to an excessive attention to the 
individual.  More specifically, Rawls is accused of being inattentive to the way social 
groups are important to individuals. That is to say, he denies the way groups shape an 
individual’s ends, identity and capacity for autonomy.  
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There is no question that social groups are important for individuals, and the 
concern over adequate recognition of difference is important. However, these critics have 
put the emphasis in the wrong place by focusing on Rawls’s conception of the self.  He 
does not assume individuals are born autonomous, but describes the role of the family in 
fostering that capacity. He also allows for the possibility that an individual may identify 
closely to a social group, and that it may be very difficult and unpleasant to revise one’s 
ends. His political conception of the self requires only that individuals accept political 
autonomy, but does not require that individuals value autonomy more generally, or accept a 
particular conception of the self. That is to say, individuals must accept that for the purpose 
of determining their political rights, they might change their mind, no matter how unlikely 
it might seem in the moment.  In this context, we should be concerned about protecting 
individual choice. To this extent, we could say that we should take a difference blind 
approach when it comes to the first principle of justice: all individuals should have the 
same rights and be treated the same way.  
However, Rawls’s conception of the group is not robust enough to account for the 
way individuals are situated by minority cultures or oppressed groups. His focus on 
voluntary associations and communities leads him to claim that the state ought to be neutral 
with respect to groups. That is to say, the state should not interfere in the functioning or 
survival of associations or communities.  This does not account for the way cultures 
provide individuals with a “context of choice,” and thus merit state-protection.  
Therefore, while abstraction from difference at the conceptual level is appropriate, 
attention to difference is required in the application of principles of justice. Rawls allows 
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for attention to difference in order to ensure equal opportunity for the least advantaged. 
However, his theory must be expanded to include attention to the way individuals can be 
disadvantaged if their context of choice is threatened.  Moreover, the state must be aware of 
the diversity of disadvantaged groups that exist within a political community, to be sure 
that the public institutions do not unintentionally favour members of the dominant group. 
 It is useful to work with Kymlicka’s defence of minority rights and remain within a 
Rawlsian conception of justice, so that we do not loose sight of the fact that individuals are 
important. However I argue that these minority rights are more consistent with Rawls’s 
political liberalism, as opposed to comprehensive liberalism.  Regardless, individuals 
always remain the priority as the reason for the attention to groups remains that groups are 
important for individuals.  Thus, I defend Kymlicka’s condition that group rights do not 
permit “internal restrictions.”  I argue that we must further reject veto power for minority 
groups, as this gives too much authority to cultural leaders.   
Despite the need to expand Rawls’s conception of justice, it is worth working within the 
Rawlsian framework.  The original position, his conception of the self that defends 
fundamental human rights, and his political conception of justice are invaluable concepts 
for the discussion of diversity and justice. 
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